Analyse de la situation politique du Viêt Nam après le XIVe congrès du Parti communiste vietnamien qui a reconduit Tô Lâm à la tête de l’Etat-Parti. Un article très documenté de Benoît de Tréglodé (Irsem).
Le 14ᵉ Congrès du Parti communiste vietnamien (PCV) s’est tenu du 19 au 23 janvier 2026 à Hanoï et a réuni 1 586 délégués, représentant plus de 5 millions de membres du Parti à l’échelle nationale. Sans surprise, Tô Lâm, le secrétaire général du PCV, a été reconduit pour un second mandat. Après avoir occupé le poste de ministre de la Sécurité publique de 2016 à 2024, ce général (de police) avait été nommé président en mai 2024, puis secrétaire général du Parti après le décès de Nguyên Phu Trong en juillet 2024. À première vue, le pays envoie un signal de continuité politique, assorti d’un durcissement assumé de l’autorité du PCV, qui renforce son emprise dans un contexte de profondes transformations sociales, perçues par les dirigeants comme susceptibles d’affaiblir le contrôle du Parti sur la société.
Tô Lâm poursuit l’ambition de faire du Viêt Nam un pays à revenu intermédiaire supérieur d’ici 2030 (c’est-à-dire avec un revenu brut par habitant compris entre 4 516 et 13 000 USD par an), puis une nation socialiste développée à revenu élevé à l’horizon 2045 (soit un revenu brut par habitant égal ou supérieur à 14 000 USD). Le secrétaire général est en effet convaincu que la pérennité du régime qu’il représente repose sur la croissance économique, érigée en dimension quasi sacrée de son projet politique. À cet égard, la résolution 68 de 2025 sur le développement de l’économie privée, document majeur du PCV, reconnaît pour la première fois, de manière explicite, le secteur privé comme l’« un des moteurs les plus importants de l’économie nationale ». Les performances économiques enregistrées en 2025 – une croissance de 8 %, malgré les droits de douane américains, et un excédent commercial de 20 milliards USD – contribuent à renforcer la légitimité du Parti.
Toutefois, l’enrichissement de la société (en 1993, le taux de pauvreté au Viêt Nam dépassait 58 %, mais il est aujourd’hui tombé sous la barre des 2 %) s’accompagne d’une tendance marquée à la concentration du pouvoir au sommet de l’État, autour du PCV et, plus particulièrement, de ses acteurs issus de l’appareil sécuritaire. Ce texte se propose d’analyser les implications politiques de la reconduction Tô Lâm au poste de secrétaire général, ainsi que ses réseaux politiques sur un territoire refaçonné par son ambitieuse réforme administrative en 2025.
Pour citer cet article : Benoît de Tréglodé, « Le nouvel épicentre du Parti communiste vietnamien : Tô Lâm et l’affirmation des services de sécurité », Le Rubicon, vol. 6, 12 février 2026 [https://lerubicon.org/le-nouvel-epicentre-du-parti-communiste-vietnamien-to-lam-et-laffirmation-des-services-de-securite/].
Vietnamese people often tell their foreign visitors that Vietnam is the most secure place in the world. The country has no terrorists, no political disorder, and the police are second to none. Decades of devastating warfare are long-past. Poverty is declining and incomes are rising in a region with good economic prospects. People in Vietnam appear to fling themselves at life’s everyday challenges with intensity and no little optimism.
But Vietnamese today are questioning ends and means, particularly as they relate to human security; they thirst for transparency and reliable ways to assert control over life. In the country and the city, in material, ideological and psychological realms, and at local, national and regional scales, the ability to feel secure is slipping away. This leads to high system maintenance costs and exhaustion as people exert themselves to amass the means and the trust they require to obtain existential security. Increasingly, questions are being asked as to whether life might be lived in a better way.
This Vietnam Update is dedicated to exploring the politics of life in Vietnam. The organisers call for original research papers that address the following sets of questions:
For many Vietnamese, the most significant risks to life come from their own region as neighbours stake claims and leverage power asymmetries in ways perceived to be detrimental to the very existence of the country. Doubts about co-ordinating mutual security through ASEAN co-exist with concerns about the merits of rapprochement with America. Preoccupations with China manifest in anxieties about encirclement, infiltration, collusion, manipulation and incitement. How are such anxieties given voice and how does the government respond? Online criticisms and protests by activists are met with repression, but throughout the country – both within the government and beyond – debate rages about how to secure the nation. One of the deepest questions is: who is to be trusted with the nation’s security?
The recent censure and demotion of high level leaders for misconduct or poor performance attests to the openly competitive nature of political power. Party leaders continue to warn about the threats posed by ideological and moral degradation, but are there indications that leaders are being selected according to new standards of meritocratic governance? It has become conventional to tie political outcomes to factional power struggles or a contest over the spoils of patronage but to what extent does politics represent a contest between alternative visions for how the country should be governed and how life is to be lived?
Capitalist market relations are central to gaining access to basic life needs formerly obtained through government programs, state enterprises and co-operatives, or via family, community or customary economies. Market logics influence the supply of housing, land, food, healthcare and education, and most government services attract formal or informal user fees. The pursuit of market efficiencies is linked to precarious livelihoods, indebtedness, and widening social disparities. How are such processes experienced and debated within Vietnamese society? Are there attempts to push back against or mitigate the commoditisation of life?
Technology, industry, science and new production and exchange systems have unleashed material plenty and improved life for tens of millions of people. However, doubts about the benefits of headlong modernisation appear in concerns about the harm done by chemical effluents, carcinogens, pesticides and unsafe food, along with urban expansion, traffic chaos and unsafe workplaces. Agrarian intensification, agricultural commoditisation and land concentration have increased productivity but also engender livelihood insecurities and pose existential threats to rural communities and customary ways of life. In what ways are citizens suturing gaps and controlling such risks through mutual assistance, security from below, or deliberative modes of living and being?
For a number of Vietnamese, the material, spiritual and psychological strains of modern life are such that a retreat into simpler modes of living, equated with the past, offers an appealing alternative. At the same time, tradition is blamed for ills as diverse as corruption, excessive drinking, age, gender and ethnic hierarchies, and doctrinaire thinking. As youths study abroad and gain exposure to the cultures of the world, many are led to wonder: what values and institutions work? Do Vietnamese need a state religion, a prescribed traditional or ‘Western’ culture, civics lessons, or democracy to have the means to obtain security and hold each-other to account?
One of the most intriguing developments in the politics of life come from networks of activists who use media, community affiliations and ties to government insiders and resources to vocally and persistently oppose official development projects, land confiscations and foreign investments considered harmful to human wellbeing. Recent actions range from social media campaigns to sit-ins, flash demonstrations, and the capture of public officials by frustrated villagers. In this workshop we are interested to explore whether the politics of material security represents a singular domain in which citizens may significantly oppose or influence government decisions and development directions through engaging in overt political action perhaps in ways not seen previously in Vietnam.
The organisers are seeking proposals for papers on these themes to be presented at a conference to be held at the ANU, Canberra on 20-21 November 2017.
Proposal Submission:
Interested contributors should send their proposals and a one page CV to Philip Taylor by 20 June 2017. Email: Philip.taylor@anu.edu.au
Each proposal should be no longer than 600 words. The proposal should outline how the paper relates to the issues highlighted in the above sets of questions and the kind of research the paper will be based on. Preference will be given to papers that promise a rich analysis and have an interdisciplinary dimension. The conference organisers will then decide which proposals to accept. We will then extend invitations to the authors of the selected proposals to prepare and present their papers to the conference. The organisers also reserve the right to solicit papers, if necessary, from individuals who did not submit proposals.
Funding for travel and accommodation is available and details will be discussed later with each paper presenter.
Paper Specifications:
The paper itself should be submitted 30 days before the date of the conference.
The paper should not exceed 10,000 words and it should include appropriate bibliography and citations. Each paper should include an abstract of 250 words.
Presentation and Publication:
We envisage about twelve paper presentations during a two day workshop in Canberra on 20-21 November 2017. At the Update each author will have approximately 40 minutes to summarise what her/his paper argues and the evidence used.
The conference will also include presentations about recent political and economic developments in Vietnam.
Organisers request the right of first refusal with regards to publishing the accepted papers, which may be included, subject to any necessary revisions to meet publication requirements, in a refereed book or journal collection that we hope will be published within a year of the conference.
For more information on this Vietnam Update theme or questions about paper proposals please contact Philip Taylor (philip.taylor@anu.edu.au).
Vietnam Update Committee: Huong Le Thu; Phuc To; Ashley Carruthers; Kim Huynh; David Marr; Tana Li; Benedict Kerkvliet; Sango Mahanty.
[ndlr] Liens vers les articles consacrés à la préparation du XIIe Congrès du Parti communiste vietnamien qui se déroulera du 21 au 28 janvier 2016 (journée préparatoire le 20 janvier). Sélection d’articles sur les enjeux du 14e Plenum (11-13 janvier) sous l’œil du PCV, des forces de sécurité et des commentateurs politiques ou des blogueurs. Spéculations, débats et prédictions sur les futurs “quatre piliers” de l’Etat-Parti vietnamien.
De source non-officielle sous forme de pronostic, les “quatre piliers” du régime à la sortie du vote secret du 14 janvier. De haut en bas et de gauche à droite : Nguyen Xuan Phuc deviendrait Premier ministre, Tran Dai Quang Président de la RSVN, Nguyen Phu Trong serait reconduit pendant un ou deux ans Secrétaire général du PCV et Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan, deviendrait présidente de l’Assemblée nationale de la RSVN. Info ou intox ?
Hiền Hòa, Bế mạc Hội nghị lần thứ 14 Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng khoá XI, ĐCSVN, 13/01/2016. Sau 3 ngày làm việc khẩn trương, nghiêm túc, thật sự dân chủ và trách nhiệm cao, Hội nghị lần thứ 14 Ban Chấp hành Trung ương khóa XI đã hoàn thành toàn bộ nội dung chương trình đề ra. Tổng Bí thư Nguyễn Phú Trọng phát biểu bế mạc Hội nghị.
Hiền Hòa, Hội nghị Trung ương 14: Tiếp tục hoàn thiện công tác nhân sự chủ chốt khóa XII, ĐCSVN, 11/01/2016. Hội nghị lần thứ 14 Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng khóa XI tiếp tục thảo luận, xem xét, quyết định công tác nhân sự Ban Chấp hành Trung ương, Bộ Chính trị, Ban Bí thư khóa XII và chuẩn bị nhân sự lãnh đạo chủ chốt khóa XII.
[Nguyen Phu Trong], Hội nghị Trung ương 14 “có ý nghĩa đặc biệt quan trọng”, ĐCSVN, 11/01/2016. Báo điện tử Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam trân trọng giới thiệu toàn văn bài phát biểu của đồng chí Tổng Bí thư Nguyễn Phú Trọng khai mạc Hội nghị lần thứ 14, Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng khoá XI, ngày 11/1.
Les forces armées en Asie du Sud-est : doctrines et liens civilo-militaires
Mercredi 30 avril 2014
de 15h00 à 18h00
École militaire
Amphithéâtre Louis
1 place Joffre – 75007 Paris
Métro : École militaire
1er étage
Habituels acteurs des jeux politiques nationaux, les armées sud-est asiatiques prennent le large et s’affirment à l’échelle régionale, notamment vis-à-vis des grandes puissances. Il a donc été décidé, dans le cadre du séminaire 2014 de l’Observatoire Asie du Sud-Est, d’inviter des chercheurs européens et de l’ASEAN pour débattre : d’une part des doctrines militaires, d’autre part des interférences avec le monde politico-industriel, notamment au sein des pays en pointe dans les partenariats stratégiques avec la France.
Professor Geoffrey Till, Emeritus Professor of Maritime Studies, King’s College London, Visiting Professor, RSIS (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies – Singapore).
Christian Le Mière, Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security, IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies – London).
Associate Professor Leonard C. Sebastian, Head of Undergraduate Studies, Coordinator of Indonesia Programme, RSIS (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies – Singapore).
Dr. Tang Siew-Mun, Director (Foreign Policy and Security Studies), ISIS (Institute of Strategic and International Studies – Malaysia).
Le séminaire est organisé en collaboration avec la Délégation aux Affaires stratégiques du ministère de la Défense et avec le soutien de l’Irsem. Ce séminaire se tiendra en anglais. Une carte d’identité vous sera demandée à l’entrée.
Les invitations sont délivrées de façon nominale. Nous vous remercions par avance de bien vouloir nous confirmer votre participation avant le lundi 28 avril par courriel auprès d’Eric Frécon (e.frecon@centreasia.eu) et Rozenn Jouannigot (r.jouannigot@centreasia.eu).