Archives par mot-clé : République du Viêt-Nam (Sud)

1948-2018 : 70 ans d’existence du drapeau du Viêt-Nam libre

[ndlr] A l’occasion du 70ème anniversaire du Drapeau du Viêt-Nam libre, initié par l’AGEVP (Association Générale des Étudiants Vietnamiens de Paris) avec le soutien d’autres associations, une grande marche s’est déroulée à Paris le samedi 9 juin 2018.

Le défilé qui serpentait dans le 13e arrondissement a rassemblé environ 450 personnes. Cette manifestation colorée a été un moment fort pour signifier l’attachement des réfugiés vietnamiens et des générations suivantes à un symbole national en vigueur au Viêt-Nam entre 1948 et 1975 et un symbole communautaire pour de nombreux réfugiés politiques après 1975 à travers le monde. Particulièrement importante aux États-Unis, au Canada, en Australie ou en Europe, la communauté vietnamienne reste attachée aux valeurs de liberté, de progrès et de justice sociale du pavillon aux trois bandes rouges.

L’argumentaire de cette manifestation en précisait le contexte :

  • 1948 : le 10 décembre, l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies adopte la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l’Homme à Paris au Palais de Chaillot.
  • 1948, le 2 juin, six mois plus tôt, le Gouvernement Central Provisoire du Vietnam adopte comme drapeau national « Cờ Càn », le Drapeau Jaune avec trois bandes rouges continues, et comme hymne national « Thanh niên hành khúc », « La marche de la Jeunesse ».

Le choix de ce drapeau est fondé sur sa signification et son symbole : les couleurs jaune et rouge représentent le peuple vietnamien de peau jaune et de sang rouge.

Historiquement, le fond jaune constitue la représentation des différentes dynasties du Vietnam, avec des écritures centrales en rouge variant selon les époques. « Cờ Vàng », le Drapeau Jaune est l’empreinte de l’Histoire vietnamienne et de ses traditions millénaires.

Les trois bandes rouges ont un sens particulier : elles symbolisent la réunification des trois régions, reconnue en 1948 après des décennies de lutte, pour laquelle des hommes et des femmes se sont sacrifiés. Elles incarnent la liberté, la démocratie et la souveraineté :

– Liberté, ou le droit à l’expression de son opinion, dans le respect de l’ordre social,

– Démocratie, où le vote citoyen et le pluralisme politique conditionnent l’évolution sociale et politique du pays,

– Souveraineté, ou le droit et le devoir de préserver son identité, son âme de toute ingérence extérieure.

Mais au Vietnam, qu’en est-il aujourd’hui ?

70 ans après, le Drapeau Jaune flotte toujours, pour nous rappeler la nécessité absolue de ces principes, seuls garants d’un état indépendant de toute puissance étrangère et qui reconnaît à ses citoyens leurs droits humains, civils et politiques.

« Pour un Viêt-Nam libre, démocratique et souverain »… rappelle la grande banderole de début de défilé. Alors que le pays traverse depuis 2011 des périodes de tension liée à l’expansionnisme chinois et que des interrogations se posent de nouveau sur le rôle de l’État-Parti vietnamien face à son grand voisin du nord, ce symbole est réapparu au Viêt-Nam même comme un défi de légitimité.

FG

Photos : © AGEVP

Reportage court :

Reportage de la chaîne STBN :

Reportage de RFA :

Chants de lutte et d’espoir :
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Célébration des 70 ans du Drapeau Jaune du Vietnam Libre – samedi 9 juin 2018

[ndlr] Annonce de la journée de commémoration de la création du drapeau jaune aux trois bandes rouges il y a 70 ans. Une marche est organisée le samedi 9 juin dans les rues du XIIIe arrondissement de Paris (quartier asiatique) suivi d’une rencontre-débat. Présentation en vietnamien et en français. Texte des associations organisatrices.

Cờ Vàng ba sọc đỏ là lá cờ trong con tim và khối óc của muôn triệu người dân Việt thiết tha với Tự Do, Dân ChủTự Chủ, không chấp nhận sự lấn át đã dần biến thành một hình thức đô hộ của Trung Cộng, không chấp nhận sự kiện bán nước của đảng CSVN đang độc quyền cai trị.

Nhân dịp 70 năm cờ vàng ba sọc đỏ, 1948 – 2018, THSV VN Paris cùng các tổ chức đồng đứng ra tổ chức mùa Vinh Danh 70 Năm Cờ Việt Nam Tự Do.

Ngày thứ bảy 09/06/2018

10g30 – Diễn hành Cờ Vàng tại ( Paris store) 44 avenue d’Ivry – 75013 Paris

13g15 – Ăn trưa, Hội thảo, Văn nghệ tại M.A.S. 10 rue des Terres au Curé – 75013 Paris

Hãy cùng nhau tham dự đông đảo để thành kính tưởng niệm các anh hùng tử sỹ đã hy sinh dưới lá cờ này, khẳng định tiếp tục cuộc đấu tranh cho Việt Nam Tự Do, Dân Chủ,Tự Chủ, và hỗ trợ những nhà tranh đấu quốc nội.

Xin gửi đến quý Bác, các Anh Chị Em lộ trình buổi sáng mùng 9 tháng 6; xin mời các thiếu nữ cùng mặc áo dài quần trắng, và các thanh niên quần xậm áo trắng, cho cuộc diễn hành thật trang nghiêm.

Tổng Hội Sinh Viên Việt Nam tại Paris.

★ ★ ★

Pour des millions de Vietnamiens, le Drapeau Jaune aux trois bandes rouges est le symbole de la Liberté, la Démocratie et la Souveraineté. Il est le refus de toute ingérence étrangère, de la Chine actuellement. Il est l’opposition à l’autocratie du gouvernement de Hanoi, qui jugule le peuple et dilapide le patrimoine vietnamien.

2018 : l’A.G.E.V.P. lance avec de nombreuses associations de la communauté vietnamienne en France, en Europe et dans le monde, une campagne de célébration des 70 ans du Drapeau Jaune du Vietnam Libre.

Samedi 09/06/2018

10h30 : Défilé du Drapeau Jaune, départ 44 avenue d’Ivry, 75013 Paris

13h15 : Déjeuner puis Conférence – Débat – Animations à la M.A.S. 10 rue des Terres au Curé, 75013 Paris

Venez nombreux à cette journée d’action et d’échange.

Rendons hommage aux personnes qui ont donné leur vie pour les Valeurs de ce Drapeau.

Soutenons les hommes et les femmes qui en ce moment, luttent pour la Liberté, la Démocratie et la Souveraineté du Vietnam.

Veuillez trouver ci-joint l’itinéraire du Défilé du matin du 9 juin prochain;  la tenue d’une tunique blanche ou d’une chemise blanche renforcera la solennité de notre Marche.

Association Générale des Etudiants Vietnamiens de Paris –  http://www.agevp.com/ – mail: agevp@agevp.com
132 avenue d’Italie – 75013 Paris
– Défendre la liberté, préserver la culture, préparer la jeunesse –

Lan Cao : Vietnam Wasn’t Just an American War [NYT]

[ndlr] Nouvel article sur la guerre, une perspective du côté vietnamien sous la plume de l’écrivaine Lan Cao.

More than 40 years after its end, the Vietnam War remains, for Americans, essentially an American experience, or more accurately, an American metaphor. The continuing American inability and unwillingness to include the Vietnamese perspective also speaks volumes about how the United States relates to the rest of the world. Americans want to be understood but rarely want to understand others.

Hollywood movies have been particularly powerful in shaping America’s Vietnam War narrative. The story line may change, but the backdrop is the same. Chaos, not just wartime chaos, not just the proverbial “war is hell” chaos, but its Asiatic variant — with the inscrutable and unknowable always lurking and pouncing upon the naïve American protagonist. Predictably, as in “Apocalypse Now,” there were fetid rivers, torrid jungles and impassive brown faces as backdrops to an American soldier’s odyssey through the heart of darkness that is Vietnam.

The overarching theme was Vietnam’s meaninglessness and what it did to Americans and America. There was always the tortured, psychologically unglued Vietnam veteran like the one in “The Deer Hunter.” Metaphor takes over as American prisoners of war were forced to endure Russian roulette, a supposedly popular game played in back alleys by natives who seemingly have little value for life. Whether this game existed was irrelevant. It served to symbolize the brutality of war and the lunacies of this particular war.

Lire la suite : New York Times, 22/03/1967.

Ouvrage de cette auteure :

Image « à la une » : Soldats sud-vietnamiens lors d’un engagement contre les troupes nord-vietnamiennes près de Khê Sanh © 1971 UPI radio by Willie Vicoy

Sean Fear : How South Vietnam Defeated Itself

[ndlr] Article intéressant de la série Vietnam’ 67. Un regard sur la politique intérieure de la République du Viêt-Nam à la suite de la déflagration du Têt 1968.

In the early hours of Jan. 30, 1968, the first Communist rockets struck provincial capitals across South Vietnam. A nationwide ground assault followed, and by morning the next day, much of the urban South was besieged, including Saigon’s radio station, the South Vietnamese military headquarters and even the American Embassy. What local papers dubbed the “Year of Sand” — referring to the ubiquitous sandbags appearing in front of the nation’s doors and windows — was well underway.

In the United States, the attacks, which came to be known as the Tet offensive, are remembered as a psychological turning point, the moment when President Johnson is said to have lost the faith of CBS broadcaster Walter Cronkite — and by extension, the public at large. Indeed, though Communist forces suffered substantial losses in manpower and morale, the contradiction between American officials’ buoyant promises and weeks of astonishing televised carnage was never reconciled. But Tet’s political impact in South Vietnam proved equally significant, and no less critical, in determining the outcome of the war.

Still routinely mischaracterized as an American client regime, South Vietnam was home to millions of fervent but factionalized anti-Communists, mostly concentrated in urban centers and provincial capitals. Reacting to the shock of Tet, they set aside longstanding quarrels and rallied in a rare display of solidarity. But the outpouring of constructive energy following the Tet attacks was hastily squandered. Instead, President Nguyen Van Thieu used the opportunity to undertake naked power grabs, compromising the constitutional basis on which his legitimacy was premised, and driving even the most dedicated anti-communists to despair. Post-Tet resolve succumbed to cynical resignation, while military confidence and commitment eroded.

As a result, a moment that could have been a turning point for the country became the beginning of the end. When the government finally surrendered to Communist tanks in April 1975, the South’s political fate had long since been sealed.

Lire la suite : New York Times (23/02/2018)

Illustration « à la une » :A family fleeting fighting in Saigon in 1968. ©Tim Page/Corbis, via Getty Images

Panel discussion : The Tet Offensive – Lessons from the Campaign After 50 Years (CSIS)

[ndlr] Annonce du CSIS sur un panel consacré à l’Offensive du Têt.

The Project on Military and Diplomatic History cordially invites you to

The Tet Offensive: Lessons from the Campaign After 50 Years

Continuer la lecture de Panel discussion : The Tet Offensive – Lessons from the Campaign After 50 Years (CSIS)

Conference Call for Papers and Panels : “1968 and the Tet Offensive”

[ndlr] Annonce du Vietnam Center & Archive.

Conference Call for Papers and Panels

“1968 and the Tet Offensive”

April 27-28, 2018, Lubbock Texas

The Vietnam Center and Archive (VNCA) and the Institute for Peace & Conflict (IPAC) at Texas Tech University are pleased to announce a conference focused on the year 1968 and the Tet Offensive. We expect in this conference to approach these historical events in the broadest possible manner by hosting presenters who examine diplomatic, military, international regional, and domestic aspects of the Vietnam War during that year, as well as the strategic and tactical decision-making and actions that led up to and followed the Tet Offensive. This will include presentations that look at all participants to include the US, RVN, DRV, NLF, and the numerous allies and other nations involved. We will also strongly encourage presentations that examine the antiwar and peace movements at home and abroad, the efforts to support the war effort, and the efforts to end the conflict through international diplomacy, as well as military and diplomatic means in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

Recent and emerging scholarship on the Tet Offensive and on 1968, more broadly, is refocusing much needed attention on some of the pivotal events that took place during that fateful year. In late November 1967, General William Westmoreland publicly conveyed his optimism regarding eventual US victory in Vietnam, helping President Johnson to buoy flagging US popular and political support for the war effort. In the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, as fighting broke out in every major city throughout the entirety of South Vietnam, many started to doubt the veracity of those previous claims, including prominent politicians and members of the American media.

Attention within the US came to focus on some of the more brutal battles that emerged as US Marines fought to retake Vietnam’s ancient Imperial city in the Battle for Hue and they came under heavy fire during in the Siege of Khe Sanh. As the fighting intensified in Vietnam, so it did in the streets and on campuses across America, as critics of the war continued their calls for an immediate US withdrawal and an end to the war. So powerful was the effect of these events that on March 31, President Johnson announced that he would not seek reelection – adding to the leadership changes already in play with the departure of Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense in late February and the emergence of General Creighton Abrams and departure of General Westmoreland as commander of US forces in Vietnam in June. The violence that year included some of the most horrific wartime atrocities committed against civilians in Vietnam, including the Hue Massacre and the My Lai Massacre, while violence in the US claimed the lives of nationally prominent figures, such as Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert F. Kennedy. The presidential election that year witnessed last-minute attempts by the Johnson administration to end the war in Vietnam sabotaged by the Nixon campaign.

By the end of 1968, approximately 550,000 Americans engaged in more than 200 major combat operations, dropped more than 500,000 tons of bombs, and the overall financial costs of the war for that year alone totaled approximately $20 Billion. 1968 resulted in the highest numbers of casualties in a single year with more than 16,000 Americans and approximately 100,000 Vietnamese killed on all sides. All the while, the North Vietnamese and NLF fought on. With a new president and leadership team preparing to take over in January of 1969, innumerable questions remained as to whether a US victory could be achieved in Vietnam.

This two-day conference will be hosted at the MCM Elegante Hotel and Suites in Lubbock, Texas. Conference organizers welcome both individual presentation proposals as well as pre-organized panel proposals that include a moderator/commentator and three individual presentations. Conference sessions will follow the standard 90-minute format to include 60 minutes for presentations (20 minutes per presentation) followed by 30 minutes for questions and discussion. Presentations by veterans are especially encouraged as are presentations by graduate students. Graduate student travel grants will be made available to select students. All presentations will be video recorded and made publicly available after the conference via the Vietnam Center and Archive website. Select papers may also be published in a collection by the TTU Press.

Proposal submission deadline is February 15, 2018

Please submit a 250 word abstract and separate two-page CV/resume to 1968vietnamconference@gmail.com. The program committee of Ron Milam, Steve Maxner, Justin Hart, Dave Lewis, and Laura Calkins will evaluate all paper proposals and develop a program that reflects the many remarkable aspects of 1968. If submitting a panel proposal, please include separate abstracts for each proposed presentation and CVs/resumes for each speaker.

Thank you for your interest in participating in this conference.

 

Contact Email: justin.hart@ttu.edu

Source : https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/events/2018_Conference/

Illustration « à la une » : photo de couverture du magazine Life, 9 février 1968 : « A guerilla is taken alive during the Ambassy battle » © 1968 Life.

George J. Veith & Merle Pribbenow : The Return to War: North Vietnamese Decision-Making, 1973-1975

[ndlr] Parution en ligne d’une étude de George J. Veith et Merle Pribbenow sur la reprise de la guerre après les Accords de Paris de 1973.

Edited and Annotated by George J. Veith
Translations by Merle L. Pribbenow

November 2017

In support of the Cold War International History Project’s efforts to facilitate the release of historical materials from governments on all sides of the Cold War, we have compiled 80 primary source documents dealing with North Vietnam’s decision-making from the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973 until the end of the war, April 1975. The documents are appended to this Working Paper and accessible on DigitalArchive.org.

Much of this declassified information formed the basis for the book, Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-1975. This array of cables, memoranda, and directives provides a fascinating glimpse inside Hanoi’s choice in 1973 to return to war—despite having just signed the Paris Peace Accords. The files deliver insights into how the Politburo of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party, and its major command in the southern half of South Vietnam known as COSVN, viewed the situation after the accords. These documents clarify, to some extent, Hanoi’s decision to resume armed conflict in the south. They further outline Hanoi’s preparations in 1974 for launching a new offensive and the goals the Politburo wished to achieve, as well as the detailed military planning aimed at defeating South Vietnam. In the 1975 time-frame, the documents provide unique insights into how Hanoi’s military commanders managed the campaign that led to the rapid collapse of South Vietnam.

While this collection is voluminous, the author of and translator for this Working Paper did not include every document released by the editors of the volumes cited in the bibliography. We reviewed each document in various Vietnamese Communist publications, but only chose to translate those directly related to the fall of South Vietnam or those which provided information of broader and significant historical interest. Thus, many documents from the volumes of the Van Kien Dang series (a massive collection of nearly 40,000 pages of mostly internal Vietnamese Communist Party documents) were not translated and included in this Working Paper simply because they dealt with mundane party or economic affairs.

Although this set of documents cannot be considered definitive, it does provide one of the most detailed views of Vietnamese Communist decision-making ever unveiled for a specific period. However, the materials included in this study are almost exclusively documentary, as we chose not to incorporate information from the numerous memoirs, battle studies, or unit histories. We did, though, feature some secondary materials from the 1973 time-frame solely to help illuminate the thin documentary record on the Politburo’s decision to resume armed conflict in the South. While these other sources do generally agree on the Politburo’s review and approval process to resume the war, we suspect that the decision was not as smooth or unanimous as the Party portrays, especially after achieving a spectacular military victory in 1975.

Lire la suite : Wilson Center

Ou cliquer sur l’image ci-dessous pour accéder au PDF en ligne :

George J. Veith is the author of three books on the Vietnam War, including Code Name Bright Light: The Untold Story of U.S. POW Rescue Efforts during the Vietnam War (1998) and Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-1975 (2013).

Merle Pribbenow is a former CIA officer who served in Vietnam from April 1970 to April 1975, and is the translator of Volume 2 of the history of the People’s Army of Vietnam, which was published by the University of Kansas Press as Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975 (2002).

Carie Uyen Nguyen : Whose War Was It? [Aug. 18, 2017]

[ndlr] Poursuite des publications du New York Times sur la guerre du Viêt-Nam dans la série Vietnam ’67 (Historians, veterans and journalists recall 1967 in Vietnam, a year that changed the war and changed America).

Perhaps no one came out of the Vietnam War with a reputation as tarnished as the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Since well before the war ended, ARVN soldiers were made an easy and ready scapegoat for America’s losses, a stereotype that found its way into academia and popular culture. We’re told they were incompetent cowards who often shirked their duties, leaving the hard work to the Americans.

As a Vietnamese student at an American university with an extensive archive of Vietnam-era oral histories, both written and tape-recorded, I’ve had a unique opportunity to dig deeper, to find all the ways that this story is flimsy and unfair. Unique because it’s not about showing that American soldiers were wrong — rather, I’ve come across account after account from American veterans talking about the courage and effectiveness of their allied brothers, the South Vietnamese soldiers.

Of course, I’ve come across many Americans with negative attitudes about ARVN. But a lot of them were rear-area personnel, people who never fought alongside ARVN and, I imagine, drew inaccurate conclusions from secondhand accounts they’d hear on base. Other negative accounts focused more on cultural differences than anything else. More than one talked about ARVN soldiers’ penchant for walking hand in hand as they headed out to battle. An American radio specialist who served in Binh Duong in 1967 could not understand it, even many years later: “That was kind of strange to us. I don’t think it was any more than they were just good friends, and that’s what they did over there, but it just seemed kind of strange.”

Other American veterans found it strange that the families of ARVN soldiers would often follow them to camp. As one G.I. contemplated: “So these troops were largely draftees. They went into the field with their wives and kids along with them in trail. When they set up the night defensive position, it was like the extended family was there. They did not want to go out and fight in many cases. They just wanted to survive and take care of their families.”

But in my research, the Americans’ critical assessments are easily matched, and then some, by sympathetic, positive accounts of ARVN. For example, many veterans actually liked having ARVN families nearby and praised the willingness of some wives to risk their lives to get fresh produce from nearby villages to cook hearty meals for their husbands and American soldiers. Others recognized that having family members nearby could be a solid source of moral support for ARVN soldiers, a reminder of what they were fighting for.

Lire la suite : New York Times

Carie Uyen Nguyen is a doctoral student in military history at Texas Tech University.

Image « à la une » : Marines of E Company, Second Battalion, with soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) during a break from patrolling near Da Nang in 1965. © U.S. Marine Corps, via Getty Images

Vers une nouvelle approche du passé contemporain vietnamien ?

[ndlr] Signalement de deux nouvelles approches du passé récent vietnamien dans le volume 15 d’une histoire globale du Viêt-Nam des origines à l’an 2000 (plus de 10.000 pages) dirigée par l’Institut d’Histoire.

  • La guerre sino-vietnamienne de 1979 bénéficie de plus de place dans l’histoire officielle et prend désormais l’appellation de « guerre d’invasion » (chiến tranh xâm lược) ;
  • Les États non communistes respectivement État du Viêt-Nam (Quốc gia Việt Nam, 1948-1955) et République du Viêt-Nam (Việt Nam cộng hòa, 1955-1975) ne sont plus qualifiés de « pouvoir fantoche » (ngụy quyền), d’armée fantoche (ngụy quân) », termes discriminants récurrents dans de nombreux ouvrages édités en RSVN. Les appellations autorisées sont  « régime de Saigon » (chính quyền Sài Gòn), « armée de Saigon » (quân đội Sài Gòn) et plus généralement les appellations officielles de ces deux États.

Ce changement d’appréciation qui peut paraître anodin a pourtant deux avantages selon l’historien Le Trung Tinh : atténuer les blessures vietnamiennes après la guerre et avoir un impact positif dans la reconnaissance sur le plan international des revendications vietnamiennes sur les Paracels et les Spratleys.

Pourtant, les organes de presse tenus par l’Armée et le Parti n’ont pas mis un arrêt à l’utilisation de l’ancienne terminologie « ngụy quân, ngụy quyền » dans les articles consacrés à la guerre de réunification du pays. Il faudra sans doute du temps pour déshabituer les auteurs de cette pratique discriminatoire pour bien des familles. Nommer l’ennemi dans les situations de guerre civile ou de guerres coloniales est souvent une affaire délicate qui peut prendre des décennies (en France nous avons les exemples de l’État français de Vichy et de la guerre d’Algérie). Plus de quarante ans après le conflit, une partie influente au sein du Parti communiste vietnamien soutient la politique de réconciliation, considérant qu’elle est une des clés du développement du pays.

Ce premier pas vers une meilleure considération du passé est un signe positif. Un geste politique officiel du Politburo vietnamien se fait désormais attendre…

FG, MàJ 24/08/2017

Việc từ bỏ cách gọi « ngụy quân », « ngụy quyền » và công nhận Việt Nam cộng hòa như một chính quyền độc lập là một bước tiến quan trọng trong việc hàn gắn những vết thương của người Việt sau chiến tranh.

Mặt khác điều này có những tác động tích cực đối với việc giải quyết tranh chấp trên Biển Đông, cụ thể là hai quần đảo Hoàng Sa, Trường Sa bằng công pháp quốc tế.

TS Lê Trung Tĩnh

Voir les articles :

Lê Trung Tĩnh, « Thừa nhận Việt Nam cộng hòa là bước tiến quan trọng », Tuổi Trẻ, 20/08/2017. TTO – “Việt Nam cộng hòa và trước đó là Quốc gia Việt Nam là một thực thể chính trị mà Hiệp định Genève 1954 có nhiều nước trong đó Trung Quốc và Việt Nam dân chủ cộng hòa đã ký, công nhận ».

Lire la suite : Tuổi Trẻ

Hoàng Phương, « Chiến tranh xâm lược của Trung Quốc được đưa trong sách Lịch sử Việt Nam », VnExpress, 19/08/2017. Cuộc chiến tranh biên giới phía Bắc được nói đến nhiều hơn trong bộ sử đồ sộ mới công bố với tên gọi chiến tranh xâm lược.

Ngày 18/8, Viện Hàn lâm Khoa học Xã hội Việt Nam giới thiệu, phát hành các bộ sách trọng tâm về lịch sử, văn hoá, biển đảo. Đồ sộ và gây chú ý nhất là bộ Lịch sử Việt Nam bao quát nền lịch sử nước ta từ khởi thuỷ đến năm 2000 do Viện Sử học Việt Nam biên soạn, trên cơ sở Chương trình nghiên cứu trọng điểm cấp Bộ.

Chia sẻ với báo giới bên lề buổi giới thiệu, PGS TS Trần Đức Cường, nguyên Viện trưởng Viện Sử học, Chủ tịch Hội khoa học lịch sử Việt Nam, tổng chủ biên bộ sách chia sẻ đây là tâm huyết của nhiều thế hệ cán bộ sử học. Hơn 30 nhà nghiên cứu sử học mất 9 năm để biên soạn bộ sử 15 tập, dày gần 10.000 trang này.

Lire la suite : VnExpress

Lire l’analyse du journaliste indépendant Pham Chi Dung :

Image « à la une » : sortie officielle de la collection de l’Histoire du Viêt-Nam en 15 volumes publiée par les éditions des Sciences sociales (Nhà xuất bản Khoa học Xã hội ) © 2017 H. P.

Nguyen Thuy Phuong : L’école française au Vietnam de 1945 à 1975 [parution]

[ndlr] Parution de l’ouvrage issu de la thèse de Nguyen Thuy Phuong. Présentation de l’éditeur, préface d’Eric Jennings, Professeur d’histoire contemporaine, Université de Toronto : « un travail rigoureux, nuancé et subtil ».

Nguyen Thuy Phuong
L’ ÉCOLE FRANÇAISE AU VIETNAM DE 1945 À 1975
DE LA MISSION CIVILISATRICE À LA DIPLOMATIE CULTURELLE
Un volume broché, 15,5 × 23 cm, 286 pages — mars 2017
ISBN 978-2-36058-077-4 — Prix public 29.00 €

Cet ouvrage fait revivre la saga de l’école française au Vietnam de 1945 à 1975, ouvrant une fenêtre sur une histoire encore largement méconnue. Pendant trois décennies, des milliers de jeunes vietnamiens suivent un enseignement en langue française au sein d’établissements toujours prestigieux malgré leur passé colonial, havres de savoirs et de paix qui offrent à leurs élèves un véritable avenir dans un pays plongé dans la guerre. Dans cette étude richement documentée à partir de nombreuses archives et témoignages recueillis en France et au Vietnam, Nguyen Thuy Phuong met en lumière les circonstances politiques et idéologiques qui ont façonné cet enseignement à une époque de mutations profondes. Elle trace avec finesse comment la « mission civilisatrice » française se mue en diplomatie culturelle face aux défis que représentent l’arrivée des communistes au pouvoir dans le Nord et celle des Américains dans le Sud du Vietnam. Cette histoire vue du haut est appréhendée aussi par le bas. Le livre décrit, de façon sensible, un univers multiculturel complexe et fragmenté qui a laissé, au-delà des salles de classe, une empreinte profonde sur plusieurs générations d’élèves qui se ressent encore dans les mémoires recueillis.

Ce livre d’une jeune chercheuse talentueuse montre à quel point l’éducation est au cœur des enjeux diplomatiques, culturels et identitaires dans un monde bouleversé par la décolonisation. Une histoire à découvrir et à méditer à l’ère de la mondialisation.

Rebecca Rogers

Premier Prix de l’Histoire de l’éducation Robert Mallet (2015)

Source : Encrage