Archives par mot-clé : Ngo Dinh Diem

F. Guillemot : Penser le nationalisme révolutionnaire au Việt Nam

La revue Moussons est désormais répertoriée sur Revues.org. C’est l’occasion de signaler notre article sur le nationalisme non communiste au Viêt Nam paru initialement en 2009. L’article a été revu et corrigé pour cette version en ligne.

 

 

Penser le nationalisme révolutionnaire au Việt Nam : Identités politiques et itinéraires singuliers à la recherche d’une hypothétique « Troisième voie ».

Résumé

Principalement à partir des sources vietnamiennes, cet article se propose de présenter succinctement les différents courants politiques non communistes qui ont marqué le xxe siècle au Viêt-Nam. Plus particulièrement, il s’attache à rendre compte de la vigueur du courant nationaliste révolutionnaire incarné principalement par les mouvements nationalistes VNQDĐ, Đại Việt ou Cần Lao, d’en identifier les fondateurs (Trương Tử Anh, Lý Đông A, Ngô Đình Diệm) ou les acteurs et de les replacer dans le processus historique de la révolution vietnamienne. L’étude de ces personnages et mouvements oubliés de l’historiographie officielle est une des clés de compréhension majeure de l’histoire politique du Viêt-Nam au xxe siècle. L’article présente un volet historiographique, un volet identification (mouvements, doctrines, fondateurs, acteurs) et se termine par une mise en perspective sur un près d’un siècle de luttes des années vingt jusqu’à nos jours. Il apparaît ainsi nettement que les nouveaux mouvements politiques clandestins d’aujourd’hui s’inscrivent dans une certaine continuité historique. La conclusion interroge l’échec de cette élite révolutionnaire dans ses tentatives d’instauration d’une « Troisième voie » de type national progressiste qui plonge ses racines dans le nationalisme révolutionnaire de Phan Bội Châu.

* * *

Conceptualizing Vietnam’s Revolutionary Nationalism: Political Identities and Singular Itineraries in Search of a Hypothetical « Third Way »

Primarily from Vietnamese sources, this article aims to briefly introduce the various non-communist political movements that marked the 20th century in Vietnam. More particularly, it focuses on the vitality of revolutionary nationalist movements mainly embodied by nationalist groups such as VNQDD, Dai Viet or Can Lao to identify the founders (Truong Tu Anh, Ly Dong A, Ngo Dinh Diem) and actors, as well as to situate them in the historical process of the Vietnamese revolution. The study of these political figures and movements, forgotten by official historiography, is crucial to the understanding of Vietnam’s twentieth political history. The paper begins with a historiographical analysis followed by a section focusing on the movements, their ideologies, founders and actors and ends with an overview of a century of political struggles from the 1920s until today. Indeed, current clandestine political movements clearly belong within a historical continuity. The conclusion examines the reasons behind this revolutionary elite’s failure to promote a “Third Way”, i.e. a progressive nationalist regime deeply rooted in Phan Bôi Châu’s revolutionary nationalism.

Plan détaillé

Introduction
  • Des sources encore largement inexploitées
  • Questions de vocabulaire, définitions
Identification du nationalisme révolutionnaire
  • Identification des partis nationalistes révolutionnaires
  1. Dans le courant monarchiste, distinguons les partis et les groupements
  2. Dans le courant républicain nationaliste révolutionnaire
  3. Les autres types de groupements
  • Identification des doctrines politiques
  1. La doctrine de la Survivance du peuple du ĐVQDĐ
  2. La doctrine de la totalité Duy Dân
  3. Le personnalisme révolutionnaire (Nhân vi cách mạng)
  4. Les doctrines des républicains démocrates
Identification et parcours des acteurs
  • Les fondateurs
  1. Trương Tử Anh (1914-1946 ?)
  2. Lý Đông A (1920-1946 ?)
  3. Jean-Baptiste Ngô Đình Diệm (1901-1963)
  • Identification des parcours
  1. Nguyễn Tôn Hoàn (1917-2001)
  2. Nguyễn Ngọc Tân (1921-2001) alias Phạm Thái
  3. Phạm Văn Liễu (1927-2010)
Permanence et évolution du nationalisme révolutionnaire : l’impossible Troisième Voie
  • Un cœur unique, le nationalisme révolutionnaire de Phan Bội Châu
  • Le nationalisme se forge une identité nouvelle :Đại Việt ou Việt Nam ? (1930-1945)
  • Une révolution nationale et patriotique confisquée (1945-1946)
  • Un nationalisme difficile à promouvoir dans la guerre franco-Việt Minh (1946-1955)
  • Quand un nationalisme chasse l’autre (1955-1963)
  • La fragmentation des forces politiques et la multiplication des Fronts (1964-1975)
  • La résistance au communisme : fronts, alliances et mouvements armés (1975-1990)
  • Le temps du changement : les mouvements pro-démocratiques, filiales des partis (depuis 1990)
Conclusion

Lire la suite : Moussons

Référence électronique

François Guillemot, « Penser le nationalisme révolutionnaire au Việt Nam : Identités politiques et itinéraires singuliers à la recherche d’une hypothétique « Troisième voie » », Moussons [En ligne], 13-14 | 2009, mis en ligne le 12 octobre 2012, consulté le 27 octobre 2012. URL : http://moussons.revues.org/1043

Roy C. Russell: Their time has come [1969]

Montagnard mother and child
© 1971 AP Wire Photo

The following story appeared in the October 1969 issue of TYPHOON magazine.  The TYPHOON was published by First Field Forces Vietnam (IFFV) of the US Army Vietnam (USARV).

 

 

Looking like their fathers of
1,000 years ago, the
Montagnards are riding out
of the past.  They are sure that

 

 

 

Their Time Has Come

By 1LT Roy C. Russell

In the Highlands near Gia Nghia, lives a pretty Montagnard girl, lithe with delicate features and black hair that streams out over the back seat of her jeep when she lets it blow in the wind.  If you are a friend, she calls you grandson (though she is only 27), and she will get you discount prices on Ba Muoi beer at the local bar.

But say the Montagnards are savages, and the flash in her eyes says she would like to come at you with anything from a M16 to a crossbow.  Say they are nomads who should not own land, or say they are too ignorant for schools, to superstitious for hospitals, and too primitive to make good soldiers, and she will erupt with the torrent of rebuttals that would scare the Black Panthers.

She can talk to you in French, Vietnamese, several Montagnard dialects, and English.  « Where did you learn these? » you ask.

« In the forest, » she answers, and her eyes twinkle just long enough to accent the mystery that surrounds her.  « You know I am 107 years old.  That is long enough to learn many things, but I am still a Montagnard. »

She represents a new generation of Montagnards, proud of its past, but demanding a modern role in the future of the Highlands.  You can help a village sacrifice a water buffalo by beating it to death with sticks and rocks.  You can watch a woman plant rice by poking small holes in the ground instead of plowing it up and disturbing the spirits.  You can sit through hot afternoons drinking ricewine inside smoke-filled longhouses which have not changed for centuries.  You can imagine you are living a thousand years ago.   But when the talk turns to politics, you know you are in the 20th Century.   The Montagnards know what time it is, and a variety of groups — some militant, others peaceful — are making sure no one else forgets.

For generations, the Montagnards have lived in the Highlands, unconcerned about the Vietnamese along the coast.   The feeling was mutual because Vietnamese fishermen and rice-farmers had no reason to leave the lowlands.  Traditionally separated, the two groups viewed one another with suspicion and, eventually, prejudice.  But in 1954, South Vietnam’s president, Ngo Dinh Diem, resettled approximately 200,000 ethnic Vietnamese lowlanders into land the Montagnards considered their own.  he also attempted to blanket the Montagnards with Vietnamese culture.  He eliminated tribal courts and disregarded Montagnard self-government and other institutions.

Over several months, many Montagnard tribes began to organize a resistance movement.  It started with casual grumbling as men sat around their longhouses complaining quietly about strangers from the lowlands who were taking up more and more of the land, and about the government which seemed to ignore their established customs.  Then, as occasional visitors travelled through the village, they learned that other tribes were talking about the same things.

Soon, messengers were hurrying along the highland trails to call a meeting of tribal leaders.  In 1958, these leaders formed a group called « Bajaraka, » a name derived from the initials of four powerful Montagnard groups — the Bahnar, Jarai, Rhade, and Koho.  United in this way, the Montagnards began working to make the Highlands a separate nation with its own army.  When letters and petitions to the Vietnamese government, the United Nations, and various diplomatic missions were ignored, Bajaraka staged demonstrations throughout the Highlands.  These brought results, but not the ones desired: all the Bajaraka leaders were arrested and jailed by President Diem.

After the overthrow of Diem, the government of Nguyen Khanh released these Montagnards.  Paul Nur, who is now the GVN Minister for Ethnic Minorities, seeks peaceful cooperation between Montagnards and Vietnamese while preserving Montagnard culture and traditions.  Y B’ham Enuol, once exiled and now living in the Cambodian jungles, became the leader of a militant faction known as FULRO (United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races), which wanted virtual Montagnard autonomy, a separate nation.  FULRO has since been replaced by a legitimate political party working for Montagnard advancement within the Vietnamese nation.  The third man, Y Bih Alio, joined the Viet Cong and fought to bring the Montagnards under communist control.  A recent VC prisoner reported that he had seen Y Bih dead in a jungle a year ago.

Part of the communist strategy for victory in the South depended on driving a wedge between the Montagnards and the Government of Vietnam.  Communist Montagnards and Vietnamese cadre from North Vietnam were sent into the highlands to live in villages, where they successfully exploited Montagnard prejudices and their hopes for independence.  At the same time, communist military units terrorized the Montagnards, stealing their crops and forcing them to fight against the government.  Since there were very few GVN representatives in the highlands, the VC cadre were not contested seriously, and by 1961 it appeared the government had lost the loyalty and cooperation of much of the Montagnard population.   To counter this, the GVN let the US send Special Forces advisors into the highlands to train village defense units, border patrols, and other reconnaissance teams.   Spirited and well equipped with modern weapons, these Montagnard units succeeded in reversing the communist success in the highlands.  Even so, the relations between the GVN and the Montagnards did not improve.  By 1964, the movement for Montagnard independence, which had begun peacefully, had become more militant.  But its goal was the same: Montagnard independence.

In late 1964, Montagnard yearnings for autonomy were increasing at a time when they had the arms with which to revolt and when the countryside was weakened by repeated coups and disunity.  This environment bred the first armed Montagnard revolt on September 20, 1964.  Montagnard strikers (Civilian Irregular Defense Group soldiers in Quang Duc and Darlac provinces) revolted, killed some 70 Vietnamese, and marched on Ban Me Thuot.  The organization which planned and conducted this revolt identified itself as FULRO (United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races).  It appears to have been an outgrowth of the Bajaraka movement with the addition of an armed military organization.  With American assistance, the GVN persuaded the Montagnards not to attack Ban Me Thuot.  But Y B’ham, the FULRO leader, fled to Cambodia with several thousand followers.

Immediately after the revolt, the government of Nguyen Khanh met with Montagnard leaders and planned an assistance program that showed respect for Montagnard traditions.  The Highlanders would choose their own representatives in the National Assembly and hold positions in the central and local administrations.  The traditional Montagnard court system would be reinstituted.  Entrance requirements for officer and NCO students would be revised to admit Montagnards, and a pre-military school for children would be opened.  The government also agreed to recognize Montagnard ownership of land and to provide assistance in developing it.  Additional schools would be built for Montagnards, and scholarships to high school and universities would be granted.  Except for autonomy, most of the Montagnard’s grievances were recognized by Khanh, and he proposed remedial action.

The Khanh government, however, was replaced through a coup in 1965, and his successors did little to implement this program.  The Montagnards felt the promises made to them had been broken.   Tensions in the highlands increased.  On December 18, 1965, there was a second FULRO uprising at various places in Quang Duc, Darlac, and Phu Bon.  The rebellion was put down in a day, and its leaders were either imprisoned or executed.

At that point, there appeared to be little hope for improved relations.  In 1966, the government of Nguyen Cao Ky began to implement General Khanh’s program.  In February, a Special Commissariat for Highlander Affairs was appointed commissioner.  At this time, FULRO forces began negotiating the conditions for their return to the GVN.  Finally, on October 17, 1966, 250 FULRO soldiers swore allegiance to the government, by Y B’ham who was still the nominal FULRO leader, remained in Cambodia.

During the following year, tensions eased between the Vietnamese and Montagnards.  Six Montagnards, including a member of FULRO, were elected to the National Assembly; President Nguyen Van Thieu signed a special law which recognized the Montagnards’ right to own their land; and the GVN established the Ministry for Ethnic Minorities with Paul Nur installed as a regular member of the Cabinet.

While most Montagnard leaders recognized that the GVN had outlined a credible minority policy, Y B’ham remained dissatisfied.  Having lived in exile for three years and still in command of a force of militant Montagnard guerrillas, he claimed to have the underground support of thousands of other Montagnards within the Republic of Vietnam itself.  Finally, in July, 1968, the government invited him to Ban Me Thuot for further negotiations.  Y B’ham returned in August to a Special Forces camp in Quang Duc Province.  From there he was flown by Caribou to Ban Me Thuot.  After a week of meetings, Y B’ham’s position narrowed to a few specific issues.  He still wanted some degree of regional Montagnard autonomy within the political framework of the GVN and with himself installed as Commissioner General.  He also asked the GVN to arm Montagnard forces commanded by Montagnard officers to protect Montagnard villages and fight the communists.

He rescinded two other demands he had made earlier: the right of the Montagnards to receive foreign aid directly from other countries, and separate Montagnard representation in all international conferences dealing with Vietnam.

With this understanding, Y B’ham returned to Cambodia and notified his representative in South Vietnam, Y D’he Adrong, to make final agreements for FULRO’s permanent return to the country.  An agreement was reached on December 12, 1968.  Among other things, it specified that the Montagnards could form their own political party, fly their own flag in the same manner as do other political parties in the Republic of Vietnam, and that the returning FULRO soldiers would be trained and organized into Regional Force companies with Montagnard leaders.  Y D’he returned to Saigon with the news.

In January 1969, more than 1,300 FULRO soldiers and their families filtered across the Cambodian border into Quang Duc Province, collecting near the Special Forces camp at Bu Prang.  From there, they were flown to Ban Me Thuot, where an official ceremony on February 1 marked the renewal of their allegiance to GVN.

Everything had gone according to plan, except for one thing: Y B’ham, the FULRO leader, had stayed in Cambodia.  The reason for this is still not clear.  Either he was not pleased with the final agreement Y D’he negotiated with GVN, or he was held captive by a dissident and radical FULRO faction which tried to subvert the FULRO-GVN accord.  In either case, Y B’ham’s absence did not stop 1,300 of his former followers from rallying to the government.

During the ceremony, Y D’he announced something which seemed to take most FULRO members by surprise: not only would they swear allegiance to the GVN, but they would also formally dissolve the FULRO organization and replace it with a new, non-militant Montagnard political party, later named the Ethnic Minorities Solidarity Movement (EMSM).  While Y D’he’s followers did not expect this mandate, they acquiesced quickly.

Since then, Y D’he has played a less active role in Montagnard politics and has turned more to farming.   Another former FULRO leader, Y Bling, took charge of the new party and continues as it chairman today.  While the EMSM works to preserve Montagnard customs and to protect the full citizenship rights of its members, it advocates peaceful accomodation with the GVN, not militant secession.  This is its principal difference from FULRO.

In a series of written agreements, the GVN has promised to issue land titles to Montagnard farmers; to provide better schools, medical facilities, and agricultural assistance; and to establish Montagnard Regional Force companies while integrating other Montagnard officers into regular ARVN units.

EMSM is now the strongest force uniting the Montagnards.  Y Bling claims 65,000 dues-paying members, but probably many fewer are ardent supporters.  Still, EMSM has emerged as the first viable form of political leverage the Montagnards have had — at least it is the first which has gained significant support from the GVN.  How long it can contain the undercurrent of militancy in the Highlands depends on how well the GVN can fulfill its plans.  In wartime, it is hard to build schools and train politicians.  The Montagnards know this.  But they also know this is the 20th Centry and that it is time they have a place in the future of the country.

It is doubtful they will let anyone forget.

 

Major Montagnard Tribes
© October 1969 Typhoon Magazine

Source : landscaper.net

Interview en français avec le général Tran Van Don [1981]

“Interview with Tran Van Don.”, 05/07/1981, WGBH Media Library & Archives, (accessed 12 Oct 2012).

As a former general in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, Tran Van Don was pivotal to the toppling of Ngo Dinh Diem during the 1963 coup d’etat. Here he recalls life under French colonialism, the rule of Bao Dai, and his relationship with Ngo Dinh Diem – leading to the coup d’etat and death of Diem.

 

Episode 103
Program America’s Mandarin (1954 – 1967)
Series Vietnam: A Television History
Duration 00:46:56:05
Standard NTSC
Source WGBH Open Vault

Source : Open Vault

Séminaire “Mémoires d’Indochine” : Mémento personnalités – séance 3

Mémento Personnalités

Rappel biographique succinct des auteurs et personnalités historiques  évoqués lors de la Séance 3

 

Partie 1 : Les deux Viêt-Nam

Pavillon national de la RDVN
(Nord Viêt-Nam 1945-1975)
Pavillon national de l’Etat du Viêt-Nam
(1948-1955)
et de la République du Viêt-Nam
(Sud Viêt-Nam 1955-1975)

 

Bùi Tín (1927-)

Dissident vietnamien, ancien vice-rédacteur en chef du quotidien du peuple (Nhân Dân, le journal officiel du Parti communiste du Vietnam). Il rejoint le Viet Minh en 1945 et exerce en tant que journaliste pour le journal de l’Armée populaire du Vietnam. Engagé dans l’Armée populaire vietnamienne à l’âge de 18 ans, il est blessé lors de la bataille Dien Bien Phu. Il sert au sein l’état-major de l’armée nord-vietnamienne pendant la guerre du Vietnam et s’occupe de la question des prisonniers de guerre américains. Durant la prise de Saigon le 30 avril 1975, il fait partie de l’unité nord-vietnamienne qui reçoit la reddition de Duong Van Minh, dernier dirigeant de la RVN (Sud). Après la victoire, il perd peu à peu ses illusions face à la corruption d’après-guerre et l’isolement de la RSVN. En 1990, Bui Tin quitte le Vietnam pour vivre en exil à Paris et exprimer publiquement ses critiques vis-à-vis du régime. A partir de novembre 1991, il intervient dans le débat sur les MIA-POW. Il publie plusieurs ouvrages en vietnamien qui font sensation dans lequel il dénonce l’appareil totalitaire communiste. Il publie en anglais deux ouvrages importants : Following Ho Chi Minh: The Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel (University of Hawaii Press, 1995) et From Enemy To Friend: A North Vietnamese Perspective on the War (US Naval Institute Press, 2002). Il continue aujourd’hui à donner son avis sur l’évolution du Vietnam à travers son propre blog sur VOA.

David Lan Pham (1940-)

David Lan Pham est né à Thu Dau Mot dans la province de Binh Duong au Sud du Vietnam. Diplômé de l’Université de Saigon, il a enseigné l’histoire et a eu de multiples activités culturelles et journalistiques au Sud-Vietnam avant 1975. Il a exercé diverses fonctions de direction en tant que Secrétaire général des enseignants vietnamiens de l’Association des Enseignants d’Histoire et de Géographie, secrétaire général de l’Association de la Bibliothèque nationale vietnamienne, Conseiller à la Confédération Vietnamienne Travail (CVT) de Binh Duong et conseiller d’une Ecole bouddhiste à Binh Duong. Il quitte le pays clandestinement avec son fils et ses deux frères en 1986. Il publie en 2000 un récit de vie dans lesquel il rend compte de la vie sociale et politique vietnamienne sur quatre décennies de guerre civile. Il publie également d’autres ouvrages dont une biographie d’Ho Chi Minh en 2007. Aux Etats-Unis, il a travaillé pour le programme des réfugiés en Alabama et a créé le Bulletin bilingue / Tin Viet et Dac San Que Huong. Pour ses activités éducatives et sociales auprès des réfugiés il est cité dans plusieurs répertoires biographiques. Il vit actuellement à Toledo, dans l’Ohio.

* * *

Ngô Đình Diệm (1901-1963)

Mandarin nationaliste et catholique, originaire de Huê. Ministre de l’empereur Bao Dai en 1932, démissionne en 1933. Il se rend aux Etats-Unis au début des années cinquante. De retour au Viêt-Nam, il prend la direction du dernier gouvernement de Bao Dai en juin 1954. Un an plus tard à la suite d’un référendum populaire douteux, il devient Chef d’Etat de la Première République du Viêt-Nam (1955-1963) qu’il fonde le 26 octobre 1955. Il met en place une politique anticommuniste autoritaire avec les Agrovilles en 1959 et les Hameaux stratégiques en 1961. Très contesté au sein même du camp nationaliste, il est assassiné en novembre 1963 avec son frère Nhu à la suite de la violente crise bouddhiste. Sa diparition plonge le Sud Viêt-Nam dans une période de chaos et de troubles politiques pendant trois ans. Pour une biographie plus complète voir Ngo Dinh Diem (par Kelsey Leonard – Cold War Museum).

Thích Quảng Đức (1897-1963)

Vénérable bouddhiste, né Lâm Văn Tức en 1897, originaire de la province de Khanh Hoa au centre. Pratiquant dès l’âge de 7 ans, il consacre sa vie à l’étude du bouddhisme. Moine à 20 ans, il s’isole lors d’une retraite de trois ans après son ordination. Il s’immole par le feu à Saigon le 11 juin 1963 pour s’opposer à la politique répressive du gouvernement de Ngô Đình Diệm contre les bouddhistes. L’image de cette immolation (Malcom Browne, prix Pulitzer et 1963),  fera le tour du monde et précipitera la chute du clan des Ngo et de l’appareil diemiste. Par ce geste, Thich Quang Duc est depuis devenu une icône internationale.

Trường Chinh (Đặng Xuân Khu, 1907-1988)

Dirigeant communiste, principal théoricien du parti. Secrétaire général du PCI à partir de mai 1941 puis du Lao Động entre 1951 et 1956. Auteur du célèbre texte La résistance vaincra, regroupant une série d’articles parus à l’origine dans la revue du parti Su That (La Vérité) du 4 mars au 1er août 1947. Pro-chinois, il est le maître d’œuvre de la réforme agraire radicale avant d’être écarté de la direction du parti. Président de l’Assemblée nationale de la RDVN en 1960. Chef de l’Etat de la RSVN de juillet 1981 à juin 1987. Incarne la ligne dure du PCV et la ligne maoïste dans les années soixante. Paradoxalement, il est favorable aux réformes du Doi Moi en 1986 à la fin de sa vie.

 

 

Partie 2 : Mouvements de résistance

Le FULRO

Pavillon du Front de Libération du Champa
Pavillon du Front de Libération des Hauts Plateaux Montagnards
(Flag by Chrystian Kretowicz)
Pavillon du FULRO
(Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées)

 

Lès Kosem (?-1976)

Officier militaire cambodgien d’origine Cham, connu sous le nom de guerre « Po Nagar », et figure marquante de la Deuxième Guerre d’Indochine. Parachutiste dans l’Armée royale cambodgienne, il fonde le Front de Libération du Champa dans les années 1950. Son organisation rejoint le front de résistance montagnarde FULRO (Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées) créé le 20 septembre 1964. Il se sépare du FULRO en 1968 après un désaccord avec Y Bham Enuol, le leader du Front. Lié aux services secrets cambodgiens, Les Kosem est impliqué dans le trafic d’armes avec les Nord-Vietnamiens. Après le renversement de Sihanouk en 1970, il devient un fervent partisan de Lon Nol et reçoit le grade de général des Forces Armées Nationales Khmères (FANK). A la victoire des Khmers rouges en avril 1975, il se serait réfugié en Malaisie où il décède un an plus tard.

Y Bham Enuol (1923-1975)

Résistant montagnard d’origine E-Dhe (Radhé), il fonde et dirige plusieurs mouvements armés montagnards. Au mois de mai 1958, il créé le front Bajaraka mais il est arrêté en septembre par le régime de Ngo Dinh Diem et reste emprisonné jusqu’à la chute de Diem. En mars 1964, il fonde le Front de Libération des Hauts Plateaux Montagnard, front qui intègre le FULRO (Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées) créé le 20 septembre 1964 dont il prend la direction. Pour divergence de stratégie, il est arrêté par Les Kosem, un des leaders cambodgien du Front. Il est assigné à résidence à Phnom Penh jusqu’à sa mort en avril 1975 où il est exécuté par les Khmers rouges avec sa famille.

 * * *

Le FNL Sud-Vietnam

Pavillon du Front national pour la libération du Sud-Viêt Nam (FNL-Sud VN 1960-1975)

 

Nguyen Huu Tho,  (born July 10, 1910, Cho Lon, southern Vietnam—died Dec. 24, 1996, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam), chairman of the National Liberation Front (NLF), the South Vietnamese political organization formed in 1960 in opposition to the U.S.-backed Saigon government.

The son of a rubber-plantation manager who was later killed during the First Indochina War (1946–54), Nguyen Huu Tho studied law in Paris in the 1930s. Returning to Saigon, he set up practice, remaining politically inactive until 1949, when he led student demonstrations against the French; he also organized protests in 1950 against the patrolling of the southern Vietnamese coast by U.S. warships. He was imprisoned and won popular acclaim for his prolonged hunger strike in protest of the war.

After the Geneva Agreements had divided Vietnam into northern and southern zones in 1954, Tho cooperated with the southern regime of Ngo Dinh Diem until he was arrested for advocating nationwide elections on reunification. Except for a short interval in 1958, Tho remained in prison from 1954 to 1961, when he escaped with the aid of some of his anti-Diem followers. These men, who had recently formed the National Liberation Front, made Tho, a noncommunist, provisional and then full-time chairman of the NLF.

Tho essentially served as a figurehead leader, while real power in the NLF was held by its military arm, the Viet Cong, and by veteran communists who reported directly to the North Vietnamese leadership. Tho helped attract a wide spectrum of South Vietnamese supporters to the NLF. In June 1969 the NLF established a Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) with Huynh Tan Phat as president and Nguyen Huu Tho as chairman of its advisory council. The PRG, in effect, became the government of South Vietnam in April 1975, when the Saigon government’s troops surrendered to the North Vietnamese and PRG forces. Tho was made a vice president of Vietnam in 1976, a post he held until 1980, when he became acting president. In 1981 Tho was made vice president of the Council of State, as well as chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly. (source : Encyclopedia Britannica).

Marcelino Truong : Une si jolie petite guerre – Saigon 1961-1963

Avis de parution le 18 octobre 2012. Marcelino Truong, Une si jolie petite guerre. Saigon 1961-1963, Paris, Denoël, Denoël Graphic, 2012, 272 p.

En janvier 1961, John F. Kennedy devient le 35e président des États-Unis. Déterminé à endiguer le communisme en Asie, il lance le Projet Beef-Up, destiné à renforcer l’aide militaire et économique américaine à la République du Vietnam. C’est dans ce contexte que le petit Marcelino Truong et sa famille débarquent à Saigon, en juillet 1961. Sa mère est malouine et maniaco-dépressive, son père est un diplomate vietnamien. Nommé directeur de l’agence Vietnam-Press, Truong Buu Khanh fréquente assidûment le Palais de l’Indépendance où il fait office d’interprète quand le président Ngô Dinh Diêm reçoit des visiteurs anglophones. Il va ainsi observer de très près les manœuvres d’un gouvernement qui se débat entre nationalisme, rejet de la France coloniale, défiance et fascination pour l’Amérique.

Marcelino Truong interroge ses souvenirs d’enfance pour brosser un portrait à la fois impressionniste et objectif de la capitale sud-vietnamienne livrée aux prémices d’une guerre qui s’intensifie. Tandis que les gros porteurs US débarquent un armement de plus en plus lourd, les attentats viêt-cong se multiplient. L’état d’urgence et la mobilisation générale sont décrétés au Sud. Des coups d’Etat sont ourdis par des généraux félons, qui aboutiront, le 1er novembre 1963, à l’assassinat du président Diem. Vingt et un jours plus tard, c’est Kennedy qui tombe sous les balles de Lee Harvey Oswald. Mêlant l’histoire familiale à la grande Histoire, Truong redonne vie à une époque, un lieu et des événements qui ont fait basculer le cours du monde et réussit un roman graphique palpitant, où les causes de la plus grande défaite de l’Amérique sont examinées avec pertinence depuis le camp des vaincus.

Marcelino Truong est peintre, illustrateur, dessinateur de presse et auteur de bande dessinées. On lui doit de nombreux albums jeunesse. Son dernier ouvrage adulte, une adaptation du roman de James Lee Burke, Prisonniers du ciel, est paru dans la collection Rivages/Casterman/Noir.

Coomuniqué Denoël Graphic en pdf.

A lire : Dans les coulisses d’ « Une si jolie petite guerre » avec Marcelino Truong sur Long Cours

La nouvelle historiographie sur Ngô Đình Diệm et la Première République du Viêt-Nam

Depuis une dizaine d’années, les recherches sur la Première République du Viêt-Nam (1955-1963) de Ngo Dinh Diem se sont considérablement développées. Les études américaines cherchent à comprendre l’engagement américain et le départ de la guerre au Viêt-Nam. Elles réexaminent également le fonctionnement du régime et la personnalité du Président de la Première République. Elles s’intéressent aux conséquences de la chute de Diem (assassiné avec son frère Nhu le 2 novembre 1963) et au rôle des services américains auprès du régime sudiste.

De leur côté, les récentes études vietnamiennes ou témoignages de personnalités proches de Diem tendent à revaloriser le rôle de ce leader et de son régime auparavant fortement critiqués dans les mémoires du général Do Mau (1986), lui-même impliqué dans le coup d’Etat de novembre 1963.

Notons que deux nouvelle études américaines sont à paraitre en 2013 (Chapman et Miller).

  • Chapman, Jessica M., Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2013 (à paraître).
  • Catton, Phillip E., Diem’s final failure. Prelude to America’s war in Vietnam, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, Modern War Studies, 2003, 312 p. See presentation ; book review by Edward Miller

Often portrayed as an inept and stubborn tyrant, South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem has long been the subject of much derision but little understanding. Philip Catton’s penetrating study provides a much more complex portrait of Diem as both a devout patriot and a failed architect of modernization. In doing so, it sheds new light on a controversial regime.

Catton treats the Diem government on its own terms rather than as an appendage of American policy. Focusing on the decade from Dien Bien Phu to Diem’s assassination in 1963, he examines the Vietnamese leader’s nation-building and reform efforts—particularly his Strategic Hamlet Program, which sought to separate guerrilla insurgents from the peasantry and build grassroots support for his regime. Catton’s evaluation of the collapse of that program offers fresh insights into both Diem’s limitations as a leader and the ideological and organizational weaknesses of his government, while his assessment of the evolution of Washington’s relations with Saigon provides new insight into America’s growing involvement in the Vietnamese civil war.

Focusing on the Strategic Hamlet Program in Binh Duong province as an exemplar of Diem’s efforts, Catton paints the Vietnamese leader as a progressive thinker trying to simultaneously defeat the communists and modernize his nation. He draws on a wealth of Vietnamese language sources to argue that Diem possessed a firm vision of nation-building and sought to overcome the debilitating dependence that reliance on American support threatened to foster. As Catton shows, however, Diem’s plans for South Vietnam clashed with those of the United States and proved no match for the Vietnamese communists.

Catton analyzes the mutually frustrating interactions between Diem and the administrations of Eisenhower and Kennedy, and reveals patterns in this uneasy alliance that have eluded other observers. He also clarifies many of the problems, setbacks, and miscalculations experienced by the communist movement during that era.

Neither an American puppet, as communist propaganda claimed, nor a backward-looking mandarin, according to Western accounts, Catton’s Diem is a tragic figure who finally ran out of time, just a few weeks before JFK’s assassination and at a moment when it still seemed possible for America to avoid war.

  • Hoang Ngoc Thanh & Than Thi Nhan Duc, Why the Vietnam war? President Ngo Dinh Diem and the US: His Overthrow and Assassination, Tuan-Yen & Quan-Viet Mai-Nam Publishers, 2001, 562 p.
  • Jacobs, Seth, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia, Durham, Duke University Press Books, 2005, 392 p. See the book presentation ; see the Roundtable on H-Diplo (pdf) ; and the book review by Nick Cullather (pdf). For other articles by the same author, see its own page at Boston College.

America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam rethinks the motivations behind one of the most ruinous foreign-policy decisions of the postwar era: America’s commitment to preserve an independent South Vietnam under the premiership of Ngo Dinh Diem. The so-called Diem experiment is usually ascribed to U.S. anticommunism and an absence of other candidates for South Vietnam’s highest office. Challenging those explanations, Seth Jacobs utilizes religion and race as categories of analysis to argue that the alliance with Diem cannot be understood apart from America’s mid-century religious revival and policymakers’ perceptions of Asians. Jacobs contends that Diem’s Catholicism and the extent to which he violated American notions of “Oriental” passivity and moral laxity made him a more attractive ally to Washington than many non-Christian South Vietnamese with greater administrative experience and popular support.

A diplomatic and cultural history, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam draws on government archives, presidential libraries, private papers, novels, newspapers, magazines, movies, and television and radio broadcasts. Jacobs shows in detail how, in the 1950s, U.S. policymakers conceived of Cold War anticommunism as a crusade in which Americans needed to combine with fellow Judeo-Christians against an adversary dangerous as much for its atheism as for its military might. He describes how racist assumptions that Asians were culturally unready for democratic self-government predisposed Americans to excuse Diem’s dictatorship as necessary in “the Orient.” By focusing attention on the role of American religious and racial ideologies, Jacobs makes a crucial contribution to our understanding of the disastrous commitment of the United States to “sink or swim with Ngo Dinh Diem.”

  • Jacobs, Seth, Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950-1963, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006, 220 p.

For almost a decade, the tyrannical Ngo Dinh Diem governed South Vietnam as a one-party police state while the U.S. financed his tyranny. In this new book, Seth Jacobs traces the history of American support for Diem from his first appearance in Washington as a penniless expatriate in 1950 to his murder by South Vietnamese soldiers on the outskirts of Saigon in 1963.

Drawing on recent scholarship and newly available primary sources, Cold War Mandarin explores how Diem became America’s bastion against a communist South Vietnam, and why the Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations kept his regime afloat. Finally, Jacobs examines the brilliantly organized public-relations campaign by Saigon’s Buddhists that persuaded Washington to collude in the overthrow–and assassination–of its longtime ally.

In this clear and succinct analysis, Jacobs details the « Diem experiment, » and makes it clear how America’s policy of « sink or swim with Ngo Dinh Diem » ultimately drew the country into the longest war in its history.

  • Miller, Edward, « Vision, Power, and Agency: The Ascent of Ngo Dinh Diem, 1945-54 », Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2004, pp. Pdf online at Viet Studies.
  • Miller, Edward, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam, Harvard University Press, 2013 (à paraître).
  • Moyar, Mark, Triumph forsaken. The Vietnam war, 1954-1965, Cambridge – New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 512 p.
  • Nashel, Jonathan, Edward Lansdale’s Cold War, University of Massachusetts Press, 2005, 278 p. (sur le conseiller de Diem à son arrivée au pouvoir)
  • Shidler, Derek, « Vietnam’s changing historiography: Ngo Dinh Diem and the America’s leadership ». This paper was written for Dr. Shelton’s History 5000, Historiography, in the fall of 2008: online article

 

Quelques études ou témoignages récents en langue vietnamienne :

  • Minh Võ, Ngô Đình Diệm và Chính Nghĩa Dân Tộc, California, Hồng Đức, 2008, 450 tr.
  • Minh Võ, Hồ Chí Minh, Ngô Đình Diệm và cuộc chiến Quốc – Cộng (Tâm Sự Nước Non 2), Diễn Đàn Giáo Dân/ Tiếng Quê Hương, 2011, 430 tr.
  • Ngô Đình Châu, Chính biến 1-11-1963  Tổng Thống Ngô Đình Diệm, California, Thằng Mõ, 2009, 330 tr.
  • Nguyễn Hữu Duệ, Nhớ lại những ngày ở cạnh Tổng Thống Ngô Đình Diệm, San Diego, cA, 2003, 270 tr.
  • Nguyễn Văn Lục, Một thời để nhớ. Những sự thật về cố Tổng Thống Ngô Đình Diệm và nền Ðệ Nhất Cộng Hòa, California, Nguyệt San Diễn Đàn Giáo Dân, 2011, 396 tr.
  • Nguyễn Văn Minh, Dòng họ Ngô Đình ước mơ chưa đạt, Garden Grove, Hoàng Nguyên xuất bản, tái bản lần thứ ba, 2-2004.
  • Phạm Văn Lưu & Nguyễn Ngọc Tấn, Ðệ Nhất Cộng Hòa Việt Nam, 1954-1963: Một cuộc cách mạng, Melbourne – Los Angeles – Paris, Center for Vietnamese Studies, 2005, 229 tr.
  • Văn Bia, Đời một phóng viên và những ngày chung sống với Chí Sĩ Ngô Đình Diệm. Hồi Ký của Ký Giả Văn Bia, Lê Hồng XB, 2001, 360 tr.
  • Vĩnh Phúc, Những Huyền Thoại và sự thật về chế độ Ngô Đình Diệm, California, Văn Nghệ, 1998, 482 tr. [réédité en 2006].

Book Review by Kathryn C. Statler: Triumph Imagined

Moyar, Mark, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006, xxiii+416 p.

Book Review by Kathryn C. Statler:

Triumph Imagined

In The Man in the High Castle, novelist Philip K. Dick presents an alternate outcome to World War II by envisioning a world in which the Axis powers won the war. Dick’s classic came to mind after reading Mark Moyar’s Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965, as both books offer lessons on history, truth, and interpretation. In the first of a two-volume project, Moyar attempts a new look at the evolution of American intervention in Vietnam from South Vietnamese Premier Ngo Dinh Diem’s 1954 assumption of power to Lyndon B. Johnson’s 1965 decision to send combat troops to South Vietnam. Opening with a brief sketch of Vietnamese history, Moyar then traces the development of South and North Vietnam as Saigon (with U.S. support) and Hanoi (backed by the USSR and China) attempted to outmaneuver one another politically and militarily. As his narrative unfolds, Moyar challenges scholars of the Vietnam War to question earlier assumptions and knowledge about North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh’s nationalist credentials, Diem’s ineptitude, the accuracy of prominent American journalists, the Buddhist protest movement, Johnson’s escalation of the conflict, and the domino theory’s viability. Moyar concludes that Saigon and Washington could have won the war if Diem had stayed in power or if the Johnson administration had provided a stronger military response. Although encouraging us to « think otherwise » through its well-written, researched, and forcefully argued interpretations, Triumph Forsaken is, in many respects, a counterfactual explanation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and fails to revise the historical record.

The book begins with Moyar’s designation of « orthodox » and « revisionist » camps. Early scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s (the orthodox school) criticized American actions in Vietnam and insisted that the war could not be won. Revisionists typically viewed the war effort as noble and winnable if the United States had either (1) made better use of its conventional military power or (2) adapted to guerilla warfare. Identifying himself as a revisionist, Moyar dismisses the vast majority of scholarship produced in the past two decades as continued orthodoxy, claiming that it is concentrated in a « relatively small number of areas, » concerned « primarily with American policymaking in Washington and Saigon, » and dominated by one school of thought that sees America’s involvement in the war as « wrongheaded and unjust » (p. xi). These statements are easily called into question by a perfunctory survey of the interdisciplinary, multi-archival, and international literature that has emerged. Equally perplexing is Moyar’s contention that his interpretation of « the facts » differentiates his volume « from all of the existing literature in its breadth of coverage both inside and outside the two Vietnams and in its use of a more comprehensive collection of source materials » (p. xiii). This is quite a claim-and one that fails to hold up under scrutiny. [1]To the extent that Moyar forces us to rethink orthodoxies, his work is commendable; but in the end, his revisionism is unpersuasive in large part because he simply does not marshal the evidence to support his version of events. In selectively quoting and caricaturing the arguments of others, he repeatedly fails to grapple with the avalanche of scholarship that contradicts his own. [2]

Before delving into some of the book’s key flaws, its strengths deserve mention. Moyar’s descriptions and analysis of military encounters and technologies are first rate. Moreover, his chapters on peaceful coexistence and insurgency are expansive in their coverage of the evolution of South and North Vietnamese thinking, particularly Diem’s attempts to govern and guarantee stability from the national down to the local level. Moyar also gives a clear analysis of the various crises of succession in South Vietnam following Diem’s assassination. Finally, Moyar offers much greater detail about American military leaders, who emerge as the heroes of the book, in contrast to the « brainy civilians, » who, in Moyar’s opinion, had no conception of Vietnamese political, military, and cultural realities (pp. 349, 416). [3] Moyar also reminds us that the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies often fought effectively and ethically.

Unfortunately, the weaknesses of the book far outweigh its strengths. Moyar has a tendency to leave out pesky details that might derail his interpretations, committing a number of factual errors in the process. For example, he incorrectly claims Truong Chinh was a supporter of Soviet policy when in fact he had a pro-Chinese orientation, he fails to offer any evidence at all to explain how the French and Vietnamese forces were on « the verge of crushing » the Viet Minh in early 1954 (pp. 28, 297, 322), and he mistakenly concludes that congressional leaders gave united action-proposed multilateral intervention to lift the Viet Minh siege at Dien Bien Phu-their « consent » and were « willing » to send ground forces if other nations contributed large numbers of troops. Rather, Congress insisted on allied participation and immediate French independence for Indochina-neither of which was likely to materialize-before agreeing to united action. Nor did united action come down to « whether Britain would go along, » which was secondary to congressional obstructionism. Finally, the British declined united action not because the « potential danger to Malaya and other British interests was not sufficiently large to justify a possible war, » but because they wanted to give negotiations at the upcoming Geneva Conference a chance to succeed (p. 29). [4]

Readers will be forgiven for asking « what Geneva Conference? » as Moyar skims over one of the most important points in the decision-making process on Vietnam. According to Moyar, the Geneva agreements suffered from a « congenital defect » in that they lacked « the endorsement of the new South Vietnamese government and the U.S. government, » both of which were « certain » to be leading actors in the future (pp. 30-31). However, it was far from certain in July 1954 that Washington and Saigon would emerge as the decision makers. It became clear that the Geneva agreements would fail only after Diem began to consolidate his control; U.S. officials made the conscious decision to replace France in South Vietnam in the military, political, economic, and cultural realms; and London, Paris, Moscow, and Beijing made other concerns a priority over implementing the accords. Moyar’s painfully one-sided depiction of the French villainy in resisting Diem’s attempts to wipe out his enemies during this period results from his heavy reliance on anti-French American and South Vietnamese sources. Like the Americans, the French were divided on Diem’s prospects for success and were not engaged in round-the-clock « plotting » and « calumny » against him (pp. 41-53).

Moyar provides valuable analysis of Diem’s rise to power and the strengths of his 1954-1963 government, although he is not the first to do so, as his book suggests. A general trend in the scholarship during the past decade has rehabilitated Diem’s image to some degree. [5] Still, Diem’s many weaknesses are almost completely absent in the book. Moyar chooses instead to blame the Buddhists and David Halberstam’s and Neil Sheehan’s press coverage for rising American and South Vietnamese hostility to Diem. However, not all Buddhists were « fanatical » and « covert communists, » and many American officials shared the journalists’ concerns about Diem (pp. 217, 228, 317). Every American ambassador from Donald Heath to Frederick Nolting left South Vietnam far more pessimistic than when they arrived. And, although not apparent in Moyar’s account, a number of military officials also held deeply negative views of the Diem regime and its successors. [6] In the end, Moyar’s claim that if Diem had lived « it is highly doubtful that the war would have reached a point where the United States needed to introduce several hundred thousand of its own troops to avert defeat » and that it was « quite possible » that South Vietnam « could have survived under Diem without the help of any U.S. ground forces » is impossible to prove and unsupported by the evidence (p. 286).

Strangely, while casting a critical eye at official American statements and documents, Moyar gives far less scrutiny to the rhetoric of non-American actors and to American military leaders. For example, in his use of translated Vietnamese sources, both communist and non-Communist, Moyar accepts at face value claims of Ho Chi Minh’s deference to the international Communist movement, the North Vietnamese dismissal of the 1956 elections, and the strength of the South Vietnamese armed forces (pp. 4, 9, 58, 181-84). [7] Moreover, in pressing his point that an invasion of the North was the best option for the United States in 1964, Moyar argues that Johnson’s rejection of the military’s proposals for « hard action » in Laos and Vietnam and his choice of gradual escalation convinced Hanoi that the United States would not put up a fight for South Vietnam (pp. 348-49). If hard action had been pursued, according to Moyar, the North Vietnamese would have retreated into the mountains and China would have abstained from the fighting, but there is little evidence to indicate that Hanoi and Beijing would have followed this script. Even worse, Moyar engages in speculative pop psychology when he explains Johnson’s unwillingness to embrace hard action through a college incident in which Johnson « did not stand and trade punches, but instead hopped onto his bed, lay on his back, and kicked frantically with his long legs to keep the would-be adversary away » (pp. 288, 331).

Finally, Moyar’s claim that American leaders and their allies believed that if South Vietnam had fallen in the 1960s, a « high probability » existed that many dominoes would have been knocked over in Southeast Asia must be addressed. In his scenario, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, and Indonesia would have toppled, with potential fallout in the Philippines, Taiwan, Burma, and Japan. Moyar also asserts that much of the international community, including SEATO and NATO members, publicly and privately supported the United States in Vietnam. There is little, however, aside from a few selected quotations from worried American officials and international leaders trying to acquire more American aid, to substantiate these arguments (pp. 138-42, 377-91). If other leaders were so concerned with the domino effect, then perhaps they would have done more than offer token troops, rhetoric, and humanitarian aid. SEATO never took an official stand asking members to assist South Vietnam, NATO countries sought ways to disengage the United States from Vietnam, and, in the end, only the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea sent troops to Vietnam, and of those, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea leveraged their aid for important U.S. economic and military concessions as well as a complete U.S. subsidy of their forces in Vietnam.

Moyar excels at creating an alternate history to American intervention in Vietnam, an exercise that undoubtedly has its uses in stimulating thinking and challenging traditional viewpoints. The problem, of course, is that we will never know the course of events if Diem had lived, or if the United States had invaded North Vietnam, or if South Vietnam had fallen in the 1960s instead of 1975. Ultimately, Moyar offers no compelling evidence that triumph was forsaken, but, by imagining that it was, his book makes for an interesting read.

 


 

[1] I refer readers to Edwin Moïse’s excellent bibliography on the Vietnam Wars, available from http://www.clemson.edu/caah/history/FacultyPages/EdMoise/bibliography.html.

[2] See, for example, Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley, CA, 1999), xiii and David Anderson, « One Vietnam War Should Be Enough, » Diplomatic History 30, no. 1 (January 2006): 2-8 for the full context of their quoted comments in Triumph Forsaken (p. xii).

[3] See, for example, Moyar’s one-sided criticism of Ambassadors Elbridge Durbrow and Henry Cabot Lodge (pp. 68, 99, 115, 236-74).

[4] See Joint Resolution Draft, 2 April 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (EL), Dulles Papers, Subject series, box 8; Draft of the Congressional Resolution, 17 May 1954, Dulles Papers, Dulles-Herter Correspondence, 1953-1961, microfilm, reel 5; William Knowland oral history, EL, OH-233 (2 of 3), 1967; top-secret report, 23 April 1954, Archives Nationales, Paris, 74AP/38; 7 April 1954, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Asie 1944-55, Indochine, vol. 290; top-secret memo of Dulles-Eisenhower conversation, 19 May 1954, Dulles-Herter, reel 5.

[5] For a sampling of this literature, see Philip Catton, Diem’s Final Failure: Prelude to America’s War in Vietnam (Lawrence, KS, 2003); Edward Miller, « Grand Designs: Vision, Power and Nation Building in America’s Alliance with Ngo Dinh Diem, 1954-1960 (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2004); and Kathryn Statler, Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam (Lexington, KY, 2007), chaps. 4, 5, 8.

[6] See Robert Topmiller, The Lotus Unleashed: The Buddhist Peace Movement in South Vietnam, 1964-1966 (Lexington, KY, 2002) for a counterargument to Moyar’s claims about the Buddhist movement. See Robert Buzzanco, Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era (New York, 1996) for American military concerns about South Vietnam’s prospects for success.

[7] For works that address Ho Chi Minh’s nationalist credentials and Hanoi’s belief that the 1956 elections would be held, see Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation under Stress (Boston, 1964); Carl Thayer, War by Other Means: National Liberation and Revolution in Vietnam (Sydney, 1989); Robert Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War (Ithaca, NY, 1999); and William Duiker, Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam (Boston, 1995).

Review of Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 by Mark Moyar, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006. Pages: xxiii+416. $32.00.

Reviewed by Kathryn C. Statler, in Political ReviewNet – Diplomatic History, Volume 32, Issue 01, pp. 153-157.
Online date : 10/04/2008

Pour en savoir plus :

Autres avis de lecture sur le site officiel de Mark Moyar.

Voir le débat suscité par cet ouvrage sur l’historiographie américaine de la guerre, en 2007 – en ligne sur pdf : H-Diplo