Archives par mot-clé : espace maritime

L’Asie maritime : pouvoirs et gens de mer – EHESS

Annonce de la suite du séminaire sur « L’Asie maritime : pouvoirs et gens de mer »  à l’EHESS coordonné par Paola Calanca (EFEO), Guillaume Carré (EHESS) et Pierre-Yves Manguin (EFEO). Deux spécialistes du Viêt Nam – Béatrice Wisniewski (EFEO-UMR CASE) et Johann Grémont (Université Paris Diderot -UMR SPHERE) – interviendront dans ce séminaire.

L’Asie maritime : pouvoirs et gens de mer (2)

Paola Calanca (EFEO, CCJ), Guillaume Carré (EHESS, CCJ) et Pierre-Yves Manguin (EFEO, CASE)

les 1er et 3e jeudi du mois de 15 h à 17h, à partir du 8 novembre 2018

Grand salon, Maison de l’Asie

Des années 1980 jusqu’à nos jours, les études historiques sur l’Asie maritime ont connu un fort développement en Occident, tant pour l’Océan Indien que pour les Mers de Chine, et ont été traversé par des courants qui influencent encore aujourd’hui leur évolution. Ces premiers travaux ont surtout été axés sur les échanges économiques, politiques ou diplomatiques, et des pans entiers de ce vaste domaine demeurent ainsi encore à explorer et à préciser. Il semble ainsi nécessaire de reprendre les dossiers de l’histoire maritime de l’Asie Orientale et du Sud-Est Asiatique avant l’époque contemporaine, en explorant/poursuivant l’exploration de la thématique de l’appropriation de l’espace maritime par les pouvoirs ou les groupes sociaux. Tout en tenant compte des débats actuels sur l’histoire globale, cette relation à la mer sera étudiée en la situant dans des environnements temporels et géographiques spécifiques, propres aux différentes aires culturelles de l’Asie maritime.

Dans une démarche qui se veut attentive aux développements des historiographies locales, passées et présentes, nous continuerons lors de ce séminaire, dans la suite de celui de l’année dernière, à nous intéresser aux populations maritimes et aux territoires côtiers, afin de mieux comprendre le rapport à la mer des sociétés locales et des autorités politiques, et les relations de ces dernières avec les populations qui tiraient leur subsistance du littoral. Il y sera également question des ports où les gens de mer se retrouvent et s’organisent, où les équipages sont constitués et enregistrés.

Calendrier des séances :

  • 8 novembre 2018 : Introduction et méthodologie
  • 22 novembre 2018 : Colloque Maritime knowledge for China seas (ANR seafaring, CCK, EFEO, CRCAO, EHESS, IEA)
  • 6 décembre 2018 : Satoumi, pour une gestion durable des zones côtières japonaises (Céline Caliaro, Paris 7-LCAO)
  • 20 décembre 2018 : Enquête sur le « Gouverneur de Kurushima » (Guillaume Carré, EHESS-CCJ)
  • 10 janvier 2019 : Ports et cités portuaires en Asie du Sud-Est pré-coloniale (Pierre-Yves Manguin, EFEO-CASE)
  • 24 janvier 2019 : Le commerce de la céramique et les ports vietnamiens du 15e au 18ème siècle (Béatrice Wisniewsky, CASE-EFEO)
  • 7 février 2019 : Main d’œuvre portuaire et équipages en Asie du Sud-Est insulaire (Pierre-Yves Manguin, EFEO-CASE)
  • 21 février 2019 : Une « Méditerranée septentrionale » ? – Le Japon, les Aïnous et les réseaux de la Mer d’Okhotsk (17ème – 19ème siècle) (Noémi Godefroy, INALCO)
  • 14 mars 2019 : « L’île des Pirates ». L’archipel des Gow Tow, point nodal de la contrebande maritime au large de la baie d’H Long durant la période coloniale (fin XIXe siècle – 1940) (Johann Grémont, Paris 7-LCAO)
  • 28 mars 2019 : La marine militaire chinoise et ses équipages (Paola Calanca, EFEO-CCJ)
  • 4 avril 2019 : La nourriture, la santé et l’hygiène des marins chinois et asiatiques dans l’âge de la voile: une comparaison transculturelle (Mathieu Torck, Ghent University)
  • 18 avril : Un métier à risque : pêcheurs dans les mers de Chine (Paola Calanca, EFEO-CCJ)


Laurent Gédéon : Le Vietnam, une géopolitique complexe [25/01/2018]

[ndlr] Annonce d’une conférence intéressante en université populaire. Sur un sujet clé, à ne pas manquer.

Le Vietnam : une géopolitique complexe

Laurent Gédéon

Jeudi 25 janvier à 19h30

Localisation : L’Isle d’Abeau

Adresse : Auditorium Jean Carrière à la CAPI, 17 Avenue du Bourg

En dépit de fortes interactions politiques et économiques, les relations entre la Chine et le Vietnam restent aujourd’hui encore empruntes d’ambiguïtés liées au poids de l’histoire. La montée en puissance de la RPC représente en effet une source d’inquiétude pour les Vietnamiens pour lesquels ce pays a représenté une menace séculaire. La persistance des revendications vietnamiennes sur une partie des espaces maritimes et insulaires de la mer de Chine méridionale aiguise en outre la rivalité entre Hanoi et Pékin. Cette situation pousse le Vietnam à développer différentes stratégies afin de renforcer sa position et de rééquilibrer l’asymétrie diplomatique et militaire qu’il connaît face à son voisin.

Laurent Gédéon : Maître de conférences en géopolitique à l’Université catholique de Lyon. Chercheur à l’Institut d’Asie orientale (IAO) et à l’ENS de Lyon.

Renseignements: up@capi38.fr ou 04.74.96.78.88

Source : Médiathèque CAPI

Séminaire “Mémoires d’Indochine” 2016 : Séance 7

Année universitaire 2016-2017 / Master Asie Orientale Contemporaine (ASIOC) / Semestre 1

ENS de Lyon / Sciences Po Lyon

Mémoires d’Indochine :

Imaginaires nationaux :

de l’empire colonial aux états-nations d’aujourd’hui

cpa_annam_surlecanaldephucam
Annam, Hue – Sur le canal de Phu Cam

 

★ ★ ★

L’espace social et transnational indochinois d’hier et d’aujourd’hui

Séance 7 : mardi 22 novembre 2016 (F004)

Cette dernière séance replacera l’espace indochinois dans son contexte eurasiatique et transnational. En se libérant d’une grille d’analyse “occidentalo-centrique”, une nouvelle lecture des guerres qui ont traversées l’Indochine est possible. On peut ainsi mieux comprendre comment les interactions entre les “trois empires”, américain, soviétique (puis russe) et chinois ont pesé et continuent de peser sur cet espace, à la fois péninsulaire et maritime. Le positionnement géographique et politique du Viêt-Nam apparaît central comme le démontrent les tensions en Mer de Chine méridionale et ses répercutions sur le monde transnational vietnamien et chez les voisins cambodgiens ou laotiens. Quelle sera la place des sociétés, du centre et de la marge, dans cet espace traversé par des stratégies concurrentielles ?

Source mobilisée :

  • Goscha, Christopher, « La géopolitique vietnamienne vue de l’Eurasie : quelles leçons de la troisième guerre d’Indochine pour aujourd’hui ? », Hérodote, n° 157, La Découverte, 2e trimestre 2015, pp. 23-38.

★ ★ ★

Exposés oraux

Espace social indochinois, marges, genre et sociétés civiles :


  • scott_zomiaScott, James C., Zomia ou l’art de ne pas être gouverné, Paris, Seuil, 2013. (titre original : The Art of Not Being Governed. An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia)

Exposé de Thomas Licciardi

Présentation de l’éditeur : Seuil


  • ha_frenchwomenandtheempireHa, Marie-Paule, French women and the empire : the case of Indochina, Oxford University Press, 2014.

Exposé de Juliette Rolland

Présentation de l’éditeur : Oxford UP


  • formosoed_societescivilesdaseFormoso, Bernard (dir.), Sociétés civiles d’Asie du Sud-Est continentale : entre pilotage d’État et initiatives citoyennes, ENS éditions, 2016.

Exposé d’Émilie Guet

Présentation de l’éditeur : ENS éditions


Image “à la une ” : © Google Map


Maritime Awareness Project (MAP)

[ndlr] Signalement par Christoph Giebel (University of Washington, Seattle, USA) sur VSG d’une plateforme interactive en ligne dédiée à la question de l’espace maritime de l’Asie de l’Est.

For anyone interested in the island disputes in the East/South China/West Philippines Sea, there is the new and still developing Maritime Awareness Project (MAP), jointly undertaken by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA and the Seattle-based National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR):

http://maritimeawarenessproject.org/about/

Its comprehensive interactive map feature is particularly impressive and informative:

http://maritimeawarenessproject.org/interactive-map/

CG

MaritimeAwarenessProject_InteractiveMap
 Cliquer sur l’image pour accéder au site

Manifestation vietnamienne contre contre “l’expansionnisme chinois” en mer de Chine méridionale

[ndlr] Manifestation d’étudiants vietnamiens contre “l’expansionnisme chinois” dans l’espace maritime revendiqué par le Viêt-Nam.

Plus de 300 vietnamiens et leurs amis internationaux du Collectif Vietnam se sont rassemblés le 23 janvier 2016 devant le Mur pour la Paix (Paris 7ème) pour appeler la communauté internationale à protester énergiquement contre “l’expansionnisme chinois” en mer de Chine méridionale afin de préserver la liberté de navigation, de survol et “d’éviter tous risques de guerre”.

Lire la suite : Mediapart, 25/01/2016 / Blog de Nguyen Hoai-Tuong

Voir aussi : Anh Ngọc, Người Việt tại Pháp biểu tình phản đối Trung Quốc ở Biển Đông, VnExpress, 25/01/2016.

Protestation organisée par le Collectif Vietnam

Collectif Vietnam

Collectif Vietnam est un rassemblement des citoyens vietnamiens ou d’origines vietnamiennes et d’amis du Vietnam de toutes générations vivant, étudiant et travaillant en France qui souhaitent soutenir le Vietnam. Source : https://goo.gl/Zm6wfH

Mer Orientale : la “souveraineté territoriale” infondée de la Chine [Vietnam +]

[ndlr] Le Viêt-Nam et la communauté internationale s’inquiètent des constructions militaires illégales de la République Populaire de Chine en Mer de Chine méridionale. Une affaire qui attise de nouveau les tensions sur le plan régional. A lire sur Vietnam +.

Les constructions d’îles semi-artificielles à grande échelle dans l’archipel de Truong Sa (Spratly), le déploiement d’armes et de munitions sur ces îles artificielles… violent arrogamment la souveraineté du Vietnam, provoquent de profondes inquiétudes dans les pays avoisinant cette zone comme ceux de la communauté internationale, sur leurs conséquences pour la liberté, la sécurité et la sûreté de la navigation maritime et aérienne en Mer Orientale. Il s’agissait de l’un des points ayant suscité une attention soutenue et ayant été le plus discuté lors du 14e Dialogue de Shangri-La à Singapour.

[…]

Depuis 2014, la Chine a construit environ 800 ha, soit une superficie plus vaste que le total des superficies revendiquées par l’ensemble des autres parties en présence. [souligné par nous]

[…]

Lire la suite : Vietnam +, 04/06/2015.

Image “à la une” : l’ilôt Tư Nghĩa photographié en janvier 2015. Source : Trung Quốc ráo riết xây dựng đảo trái phép trên Biển Đông, Doi song va Phap luat, 21/02/2015.

 

André Menras : ‘Battering ram’ and ‘spill-over’ - a chronology of the Chinese annexation of the Paracels

Conférence internationale de Đà Nẵng

“Hoàng Sa Trường Sa: sự thật lịch sử”

19-20 et 21 juin 2014

*

‘Battering ram’ and ‘spill-over’

a chronology of the Chinese annexation of the Paracels, a strategic base for control of the South-East Asia Sea

by André Menras

AndréMenras2011
André Menras Ho Cuong Quyet
© 2011 AFP Hoang Dinh Nam

 

Introduction:

We cannot understand the current situation if we restrict ourselves to a few recent events without taking the risk of viewing current confrontations as an expression of territorial ‘disputes’ where there would be little to choose between the parties in the confusion of responsibility and legitimacy. Pontius Pilate-like neutrality of this kind would exclude any possibility of a fair settlement without which there could be no actual or enduring peace. A chronological study of the key historical moments is absolutely essential, if not sufficient, to identify the sources of the conflict and their current expression in order to weigh them up more effectively to reach a settlement.

Throughout this talk I will not be using the term ‘the South China Sea’, because this term invented by colonial cartographers, from the 1960s onwards, and used in the majority of atlases, has, whether innocently or not, negative connotations in terms of sovereignty. Indeed, as demonstrated by going from ‘South China Sea’ to ‘South Chinese Sea’, a simple change in wording dispossesses bordering countries of this vital maritime area in favour of the Empire. This Mediterranean of South East Asia is not historically or legally, or in ancestral traditions, an exclusively Chinese lake. It is the common property of the countries which border it and the international community which increasingly uses it.

The pre-colonial period

Towards undisputed sovereignty

  • 1702 → The first Hoàng Sà brigade: 70 men from An Vĩnh.(Nguyễn Lords)
  • 1816→ The Emperor  Gia Long : Declaration of the Sovereign Rights of the An nam Empire over Hoàng Sa ( Cát Vàng)
  • 1833 to 1836→ Minh Mang orders: construction of a temple and sovereignty memorial stone, mapping, and the planting of trees
  • 1867→ Thủ Đức awards the title of ‘Hero’ to the sailors sent to Hoàng Sa and who perished during their voyage.

These coherent State acts by the Kingdom of An Nam fully justify the right to sovereignty. 

First colonial period up to the start of the 20th century:

China’s acts which acknowledge Vietnamese sovereignty over  the Paracels

  • 1884: The Treaty of Huế (article 15): “France undertakes to guarantee henceforth the integrity of the realms of His Majesty the King of An Nam”. The Paracel archipelago is one of these realms.
  • 1884: Chinese map of the ‘unified empire’ whose southern border extends only as far as Hai Nan. It does not therefore include the Paracels.
  • 1885: The Franco-Chinese Treaty of Tientsin:  China withdraws any claim to sovereignty over Vietnam and therefore the Paracels.
  • 1906: According to the ” Zhong guó Dìhixué jiao ke shu “, the official school geography textbook, the southernmost point in the country is 18° 13′ latitude north i.e. the south of Hai Nan Island.  The Paracels are therefore not part of the Empire.

First colonial period up to 1945

The beginning of Chinese ambitions:

  • 1909: 24-hour landing of Admiral Li Zhun on Phú Lâm (Pattle) Island under the orders of the Governor of Guangdong and Guangxi.
  • 1921: The Provincial Governor of Canton announces that he wishes to annex the archipelago and annex it to Hainan.
  • 1925: The General Governor of Indochina reaffirms that the archipelagos are An nam lands under French protectorate.
  • 1925-1936: Series of articles by Henri Cucherousset in ‘L’éveil économique de l’Indochine’ (The Economic Awakening of Indochina)
  • 1931-1932: China allows private individuals to collect guano on the archipelago. France objects.
  • 1937- 1939: Detachment of colonial guards on Pattle to build a lighthouse, a weather station, a radio station, and erect a memorial:” The French Republic – Kingdom of Annam – Archipelago of the Paracel Islands -1816- Pattle Island 1938″.

Second colonial period up to 1954

Chinese ambitions become burgeoning claims to sovereignty.

  • 1945: Potsdam Conference – Nationalist China is given the mission of disarming Japan north of the 16th parallel.
  • 1947: Chiang Kaï Chek’s troops land on the eastern Paracel islands. France sends a military detachment which establishes a garrison on Pattle. France suggests international arbitration, which China refuses.
  • 1947: appearance of the first U-shape line with 11 dashes of the S-E Asia Sea.  
  • 1950: China evacuates its garrison on Woody Island. Control of the archipelagos is officially handed over to Bảo Đại.
  • 1951: San Francisco conference. The Paracels and Spratleys are not attributed to any country. The Soviet Union suggests Mao’s China: rejected with a crushing majority. Bảo Đại’s Foreign Minister reaffirms Vietnamese sovereignty. France is silent on the matter.
  • 1954: The Geneva Accords: all the islands are now administered by the SRV (south of the 17th parallel). No Chinese protests during the negotiations.

After Geneva up to the departure of the USA…

The violence of the “fait accompli”.

  • 1956: French retreat and relief by SRV troops on Pattle and the Crescent Group. PRC troops land discretely on the eastern side ( the Amphitrite Group ). This time they will stay.
  • 1958: Diplomatic memo from Phạm Văn Đồng  who ‘notes and approves’ a PRC declaration which sets the boundaries of China’s territorial waters at 12 nautical miles. Peking uses this to support its claims to sovereignty over the archipelagos.
  • 1974: The Chinese navy takes the entire archipelago by force. 64 Vietnamese die. The nearby US Seventh Fleet, do not come to the rescue when asked. The Republic of Vietnam’s observer at the U.N asks for the situation to be considered by the Security Council. Without success. No support is forthcoming from the USA or France.

After 1974 until 2009

China secures  the Hoàng Sa base. Legitimisation. New shows of strength.

  • 10 December 1982: Montego Bay Convention on the Law of the Sea signed and ratified by China and Vietnam will come into force in 1994: “art. 89: no state may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty’.
  • March 1988: violent battle on Gac Ma (Johnson South Reef). 74 vietnamese killed.
  • 1992: Peking grants the US company Crestone Energy a concession for petrol exploration in Vietnam’s EEZ.
  • 1989 to 1995 occupation of additional reefs and small islands including that of Panganaban reef.( Mischief reef) (The Philippines’ EEZ).
  • 2002: Declaration Of Conduct (D.O.C), “gentlemen’s agreement”. Between China and the ASEAN states. Start of a Chinese campaign of threats and bullying to dissuade foreign companies from cooperating with Vietnam and the  Philippines in these countries’ EEZs…
  • 2007: Chinese law establishes the town of “Tam Sa” attached to Hainan and based in Phú Lâm (Paracels).

From 2009 onwards: consolidation, legitimization, the escalating crisis accelerates, new shows of strength

2009

  • March: the USNS “Impeccable”: path blocked by Chinese naval vessels
  • April: Quingdao: demonstration of the military power of the navy
  • May: – diplomatic memo to the Secretary General of the UN, in reaction to the submission on Vietnam’s sovereignty and the joint submission by this country and Malyasia, which deemed these submissions as ‘illegal and invalid’. China reaffirms its sovereignty based on its famous ‘9-dotted line’, without any historic or legal basis, covering 80% of the maritime zone and all the archipelagos.
  • From 16 May to 1 August: unilateral ban on fishing in the zone claimed by Peking; – setting up of a special department attached to Foreign Affairs to ‘manage questions related to maritime sovereignty’.
  • October: ASEAN summit : Refusal to consider differences over the SE Asia Sea in multi-party talks.
  • December:  ‘To Develop tourism on a large scale’ in the U-shaped zone, the Chinese National Assembly adopts the law to protect and develop the islands.

2011

  • May:  aggression against the ‘Bình minh 02′, a seismic exploration vessel belonging to the Pétrovietnam company,  from Chinese vessels in Vietnam’s EEZ. Goal: to make the EEZ a disputed zone…
  • September: aggression against the ‘Viking II’ from the same company in Vietnam’s EEZ.

2012

  • April: ASEAN summit – China pressures Cambodia, then President, to prevent a joint communiqué concerning a declaration of conduct with legal force (DOC) in the SE Asia Sea.
  • April-May:  Scarborough shoal (Spratleys) : 3-week confrontation with the Philippines within Manila’s EEZ.
  • July: China elects the ‘President of Tam Sa’. Installation of a 3G satellite communications centre on Phú Lâm.
  • August: 23,000 Chinese fishing boats leave Quang Dong and Hainan to fish in the SE Asia Sea – PLA division-sized military unit established in Phú Lâm for the ‘defence zone of “Tam Sa” as an ‘instrument for governing the sea’.

2013

  • June: publication of the book: ‘The city of Tam Sa, China: its history, resources, and role in national defence’.
  • November: ‘Air Defence Identification Zone’ (ADIZ) decreed by China above the East China Sea. Japan and the 10 countries in ASEAN declare that they agree to “cooperate more in order to ensure the freedom of flight and the security of civil aviation…”

2014

  • January: Decree from the Hainan province requiring authorisation from any ‘foreign’ fishing boat active in the ‘U-shaped line’ under penalty of large fines and sanctions which could result in their boat being confiscated and having to appear before a Chinese court.
  • May:  Installation of a huge  oil platform (HD981)  inside Vietnam’s EEZ, 119 nautical miles from the Lý Sơn baseline. The goal – to turn Vietnam’s EEZ into a disputed zone.

The key elements of Peking’s expansionist strategy

  • 1°)  In the expansionist process, ‘going out’ towards the south, Peking began with the closest point: the Paracels archipelago.
  • 2°) From this secure base, Peking begins to take steps towards establishing new bases inside the EEZ of bordering nations which China wants to turn into ‘disputed zones’ with a ‘battering ram’.
  • 3°) China has always taken advantage of the ‘emptiness’ following the departure of other powers (1956, 1974, 1988 and currently) by following a strategy  of threats, military violence and fait accompli.
  • 4°) China has only ever signed international or regional agreements so that it can then violate them. However, China is a signatory of the Charter of the United Nations ‘art. 2.4: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state…’
  • 5°) A diplomatic strategy of division, refusal to participate in multi-party negotiations, refusal of international arbitration. A strategy supported by a policy of economic incentives and reprisals.

The international community’s responsibilities and debt

  • The French colonial state in a certain way helped An nam to free itself of Chinese influence and retain a large part of its territorial integrity. From another angle, it sometimes forgot and even betrayed the ‘protected’ country for its own short-term interests. The hesitation and wavering fuelled China’s ambitions:
  • “The Paracels could constitute a bargaining chip or be used as compensation as concessions from us on other issues” (Letter dated 20 March 1930 from P. Pasquier Governor General of Indochina to the Minister of Colonies.)
  • Silence from France at the San Francisco Conference in 1951 and after the Chinese invasion of the Paracels in 1974.
  • The Nixon-Kissinger US administration: inaction when the Chinese attacked in 1974. Silence from the nearby 7th fleet.
  • “The USA’s position is not to support Vietnam’s claims to sovereignty over the islands.”  Henry Kissinger. (Foreign relations of the United states 1969-1976; Volume XVIII, China 197361976; Document 66).
  • Neutrality is a fight for the law and justice. This was the lesson of Munich.

The fishermen of Central Vietnam – victims of Chinese aggression

  • A very limited chronology of aggressions (between 2002 and 2013)
  • Around 2000 fishermen victims around and off the coast of the Hoàng Sa archipelago.
  • Approximate total Attacks: several hundred.
  • Fishermen who have been killed or who have ‘disappeared’: 30
  • Fishermen who have been rammed and just saved: 120.
  • Sunk or confiscated fishing boats: approx. 30.
  • Fishermen kidnapped for a ransom in Phú Lâm (for between a few days and a month and a half): approx. 500.
  • Ransoms: around $5000 – 8000 per fishing boat: Amount unknown.
  • Fishing gear systematically destroyed or confiscated: Amount unknown.
  • Fish catches systematically confiscated: Amount unknown.

Don’t Human Rights apply at sea?

Terrorism and human tragedy.

  • Mrs Nguyễn Thị Hào (Bình Châu village, Quảng Ngãi).
  • “I lost my husband and my son when they were fishing in Hoàng Sa in 2008. They disappeared near Bombay  island along with 7 of their fellows. Nine people in all.”
  • Mrs Trương Thị Nhi ( Bình Châu ):“They shot him and killed him.”
  • Mr Nguyễn Thành Đồng ( Bình Châu):“In this region, when a woman loses her husband, the family loses everything”
  • Mr Tiêu Viết Là ( Bình Châu ):“Three of them hit me. I’ve been hurt since and can’t go out to sea. My fishing boat has been confiscated and I have to pay a ransom. I’ve lost everything”.
  • Mr Nguyễn Đặc ( Lý Sơn):“Having just what you need to eat or enjoy prosperity depends on Hoàng Sa”.

 

Conclusion: Compensation?

In April 2014 the Maritime Affairs Tribunal in Shanghai ordered the confiscation of a Japanese shipment to compensate for a war debt dating back to 1936: thirty million dollars for two confiscated boats. The Japanese paid.

How many tens of billions of dollars does China owe Vietnam for forcibly borrowing the Paracels for 40 years, for the lack of economic gains that this represents, for the families of Vietnamese soldiers killed during the annexation of the archipelago, for the thousands of mistreated fishermen who were banned from fishing for decades, for the dozens of fishermen killed, for the dozens of fishing boats sunk and confiscated, and for the hundreds of ransoms paid out? If the damages of this monumental hold-up and its consequences were only measured in terms of money, then the compensation would at least boost Vietnam’s economy for years and get thousands of families, who are still victims of these crimes, out of poverty.

For the Chinese leaders, the only way to get out of this tragedy positively is the opposite of the approach they have chosen to impose: all acts of aggression and incursion need to stop immediately in the maritime and island zone under Vietnamese sovereignty and measures taken to give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar i.e. return Hoàng Sa to Vietnam. Any other approach can only be short-lived and lead China into a painful impasse and peace with it.

Some resources on the fishermen

Video: “Hoàng Sa Vietnam : painfull loss, la meurtrissure” (posted on YouTube)