Archives de catégorie : Signalements

Marie de Rugy : Aux confins des empires – Cartes et constructions territoriales dans le nord de la péninsule indochinoise (1885-1914)

Parution aux éditions de la Sorbonne. Présentation de l’éditeur.

Au milieu des années 1880, les marges septentrionales de la péninsule Indochinoise sont soumises à une double conquête coloniale, celle de l’Annam et du Tonkin par les Français, et celle de la Haute-Birmanie par les Britanniques. Aux explorations fluviales s’ajoutent la délimitation des frontières et la cartographie régulière des territoires sous l’égide des différents services géographiques. Diplomates chinois, siamois et européens négocient dans les capitales et dans les montagnes, sous la tente. Topographes européens et indiens arpentent les routes et les sentiers pour lever les itinéraires et mesurer l’espace. Ils s’enquièrent auprès des habitants du juste toponyme, collectent et font traduire des cartes autochtones, interrogent leurs guides, les chefs locaux et les marchands venus de Chine.

Ce livre retrace les politiques institutionnelles, les pratiques de terrain et les constructions territoriales qui en découlent. Par une étude croisée de la cartographie dans ces espaces, il met en lumière le statut central d’un territoire spatialement périphérique, à propos duquel on a pu parler d’une « géographie de l’ignorance ». À rebours de quelques idées reçues, il montre que les cartes ont un pouvoir limité, même en contexte colonial, si l’on accepte de dépasser les discours pour observer les modalités de leur production et leurs différents usages.

Source : Éditions de la Sorbonne

Séra : Concombres amers

[ndlr] Parution le 19 septembre 2018 du nouveau roman graphique du dessinateur Séra. Présentation de l’éditeur : Concombres amers. Les racines d’une tragédie. Cambodge 1967-1975. Nous remercions Sylvain Boulouque pour le signalement.

Collection : Marabulles – Biopic et roman graphique

Ce récit graphique raconte, depuis les années 60, la montée tragique qui va conduire au génocide Khmer, depuis la fuite du prince Sihanouk en 1969 jusqu’à la prise de Phnom Penh le 17 avril 1975.

Un gamin emprunte un sentier interdit. Il s’enfonce dans la végétation et il voit les pendus dans les arbres. Ce gamin, c’est Séra, il a neuf ans. En 1975, ses parents et leurs trois enfants sont expulsés par les Khmers rouges. Phnom Penh est tombé, Pol Pot arrive. Son père khmer, est expulsé de l’enceinte de l’Ambassade de France où la famille a trouvé refuge ! Séra est alors âgé de quatorze ans. Il est encore trop tôt pour qu’il puisse raconter la vie « d’avant ».

Séra sait parfaitement que les mots seuls sont bien faibles pour dénoncer cette violence, cette barbarie. De plus, les mots laissent la place à une zone floue où le « sacro-saint » imaginaire du lecteur risque de s’engouffrer et de l’emmener bien loin de la réalité… Il n’en est pas question ! C’est pourquoi l’image s’impose.

Préface par Tardi.

Source : Marabout

Colette Zytnicki : Traces historiques et mémoire collective

Conférence de l’historienne Colette Zytnicki (Université Toulouse – Jean Jaurès) abordant la question des « traces involontaires » et les interactions entre mémoire et histoire. Mise en ligne sur Canal U.

Mémoire et traces, séance 1 : Des archives environnementales aux archives papier, des traces mnésiques aux traces historiques, de la mémoire individuelle à la mémoire collective, de l’histoire de la terre à celle des sociétés humaines.

Références mentionnées :

Carlo Ginzburg, « Signes, Traces, Pistes. Racines d’un paradigme de l’indice », Le Débat, 1980/6, n°6.

Arlette Farge, Le goût de l’archive, Paris, Seuil / Histoire, 1989 (réédition 1997). Résumé en ligne.

Jules Michelet, Histoire de France, Livre IV, Paris, Flammarion, 1833 (réédition 1974).

Charles-Victor Langlois & Charles Seignobos, Introduction aux études historiques, Paris, Hachette, 1898.

Pierre Laborie, Le chagrin et le venin. Occupation. Résistance. Idées reçues, Paris, Bayard, 2011. Résumé en ligne.

François Hartog, Régimes d’historicité. Présentisme et expériences du temps, Paris, Seuil, Histoire, La librairie du XXIe siècle, 2003. Résumé en ligne.

Quang dies and a vacuum opens in Vietnam [Asia Times]

[ndlr] Le décès soudain du président de la RSVN ouvre une période incertaine au sein du cercle très fermé du Polit-Buro vietnamien. Dans cet article renseigné, le journaliste David Hutt revient sur l’action et le rôle de Tran Dai Quang ces deux dernières années. De son côté, la BBC organise une table ronde sur les réactions et les conséquences de cette disparition.

President Tran Dai Quang’s demise will enliven factional rivalry inside the ruling Communist Party ahead of an increasingly uncertain leadership transition

Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang died on Friday morning after months of public speculation about his poor health, creating a power vacuum in the communist country’s triumvirate leadership structure.

As the former head of the fearsome Ministry of Public Security, Quang was known as a hard-line figure in the ruling Communist Party, but since last year was also seen as a budding rival to the nation’s top politician, Party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong.

The cause of Quang’s death was not immediately announced but local media reports quoted a senior healthcare official as saying he suffered from a “serious illness.” Quang was receiving treatment at Hanoi’s Military Central Hospital when he died just after 10am this morning, the reports said.

A member of the Politburo since 1997 and the dominant force within the Ministry of Public Security for the last 15 years, Quang has served as the ceremonial head of the government since becoming president at the January 2016 Party Congress, a quinquennial event.

It was no secret, however, that Quang often butted heads with Trong, who has launched a politicized anti-corruption drive and shifted the Party back towards its ideological roots since the Congress. While neither official had made any public comments about their disagreements, the rivalry had been a rich source of speculation over the last year.

Lire la suite : Asia Times, 21/09/2018. Article traduit en vietnamien sur le site d’information indépendant Viet Nam Thoi Bao de Pham Chi Dung : Chủ tịch nước chết và vùng cấm hé mở

La BBC, programme en vietnamien a organisé aujourd’hui une table ronde sur cette disparition, le legs politique de Tran Dai Quang et ses conséquences.

Vietnam’s President Tran Dai Quang dies of illness at 61

[ndlr] La disparition du Président de la République socialiste du Viêt-Nam a été annoncée. Selon l’agence VnExpress : « Le président Tran Dai Quang est décédé à l’âge de 62 ans ce matin à Hanoi après une maladie virale rare ».  Voir la vidéo en ligne.

HANOI, Vietnam — Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang, the country’s No. 2 after the ruling Communist Party’s leader, died Friday after a serious illness, the government said. He was 61.

Quang passed away despite “utmost efforts to treat him by Vietnamese and foreign professors and doctors and care by the party and state leaders,” the statement said. It said Quang died at a military hospital in Hanoi but did not elaborate on his illness.

The state-run online newspaper VnExpress quoted a former health minister and the head of a national committee in charge of leaders’ health, Nguyen Quoc Trieu, as saying that Quang had contracted a rare and toxic virus since July last year and had traveled to Japan six times for treatment. He did not specify the virus.

Trieu said the president lapsed into a deep coma hours after being admitted to the National Military Hospital 108 on Thursday afternoon.

Lire la suite : The Washington Post, 21/09/2018. Kham/Pool Photo via AP, File.

Parcours biographique : Vietnam +

Voir également :

Le président Tran Dai Quang a été contaminé par quel virus ?
A lire sur Radio Free Asia Vietnam

Mort du président vietnamien, Tran Dai Quang, qui était gravement malade, Le Monde, 21/09/2018. Figure du camp conservateur au sein du régime communiste, il s’est éteint vendredi à l’âge de 61 ans.

Vietnam President Tran Dai Quang dies aged 61, BBC Vietnamese, 21/09/2018.

Infographie de son ascension :

Source : site dédié aux activités du président de la RSVN

H-Diplo Roundtable XX, 2 on Vietnam’s Communist Revolution: The Power and Limits of Ideology

[ndlr] Une table ronde sur le dernier ouvrage de Tuong Vu, à lire sur le site de H Diplo.

Roundtable Editors: Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse

Roundtable and Web Production Editor: George Fujii
Introduction by Peter B. Zinoman

Tuong Vu.  Vietnam’s Communist Revolution:  The Power and Limits of Ideology.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2017.  ISBN:  9781107154025 (hardback, $105.00); 9781316607909 (paperback, $35.99).

URL: http://www.tiny.cc/Roundtable-XX-2

Contents

Introduction by Peter B. Zinoman, University of California, Berkeley

© 2018 The Authors.
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States License.

 

Introduction

by Peter B. Zinoman, University of California, Berkeley

I this forum on Tuong Vu’s Vietnam’s Communist Revolution: The Power and Limits of Ideology, four distinguished historians address critical questions raised in the book about the history of Vietnamese Communism. They include Christopher Goscha (the most important historian of Vietnam writing today in English), Sophie-Quinn Judge (author of the best biographical study of Ho Chi Minh in any language), Stein Tønnesson (a prolific scholar of the ‘international’ history of Vietnam in the 1940s) and Alec Holcombe, (a brilliant young historian of Vietnamese Communism). The four participants sort themselves into two factions, a war-era faction (Quinn-Judge and Tønnesson) who reject Tuong Vu’s central claims, and a post-war faction (Goscha and Holcombe) who endorse them. The division on exhibit here confirms that, despite the passage of over four decades, old disputes over interpretations of the Vietnam War remain unresolved.

While many Western-language studies have explored discrete periods in the history of Vietnamese Communism, Vietnam’s Communist Revolution is the first sweeping examination of the movement from its origins in the 1920s through the post-Vietnam War era. Based on a trove of vernacular-language sources of unparalleled scope and depth, it proposes a novel and interesting periodization of Vietnamese Communism (1917-1930, 1931-1940, 1940-1951, 1953-1960, 1957-1963, 1964-1975, 1976-1979, 1980-1991, 1991-2010) and offers a wide-ranging account of its evolution over time.   The historical insight featured in the book is especially impressive given Tuong Vu’s disciplinary background in political science. Supplementing his arguments about continuity and change, Tuong Vu advances the straightforward thesis that the most influential factor in the history of Vietnamese communism has been its leaders’ unwavering devotion to the political ideas of Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong. This thesis makes a modest contribution to the political science scholarship, Tuong Vu notes, by adding “another case to the comparative literature, demonstrating the salience of revolutionary ideology in world politics” (13). In the context of Vietnam War studies, on the other hand, Tuong Vu’s thesis represents a forceful intervention into one of the oldest and most contentious debates in the field.

During the Vietnam conflict, ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ disagreed about the fundamental political orientation of America’s enemy. For hawks, both the northern Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the guerilla insurgency that it supported in the southern Republic of Vietnam (RVN) were principally motivated by a version of Communist internationalism. As evidence, hawks pointed to Ho Chi Minh’s long career as a Comintern agent, the integration of the DRV into the Eastern bloc, the violent social revolution (including the land reform and collectivization) that the Party spearheaded in the North, and the Vietnamese movement’s formal veneration of Mao and Stalin.  For hawks, the Communist leadership’s relentless and ultimately successful drive to conquer South Vietnam derived from a quasi-religious desire to liberate countrymen oppressed by capitalism and imperialism.

For doves, on the other hand, the Vietnamese Communist leadership’s core motivation was nationalism. As evidence, they pointed out that the two great causes animating the movement between 1925 and 1975 were freedom from colonial rule and territorial unification. They also found an intense nationalism in the trope of ‘resistance to foreign invasion’ that saturated the historical narratives and political culture promoted by Vietnamese Communism.  For doves, the critical nationalist agenda of the Vietnamese Communists was an important reason why the containment doctrine should never have been applied to the country and why the American intervention was misguided from the start.

Tuong Vu’s argument about the devotion of Vietnamese Communist elites to a radical leftist ideology reprises the hawkish position but he fortifies it significantly by mobilizing a massive new body of corroborating evidence. “In researching his topic,” Holcombe points out, “Tuong Vu took advantage of thousands of Party resolutions, orders, circulars, and general policy statements made public by the Vietnamese government in its 2001 Party Documents series. He appears to have read, cover to cover, every one of this series’ fifty-nine volumes, along with a variety of newspapers, archival materials, memoirs, and secondary scholarship.” Tuong Vu’s exceptionally wide reading impresses even his toughest critics. Tønnesson praises his “thorough research and impressive erudition” while Quinn-Judge, in an otherwise unsympathetic review, acknowledges that the “author has gone farther and deeper into this topic than any previous writer in English.”

While they do not map on to each other with complete precision, the dovish and hawkish positions dovetail with contending schools of historical interpretation of the Vietnam War known as orthodoxy and revisionism. The persistence of these tendencies in the field may be seen in two issues raised in the Forum about which reviewers express conflicting views. The first is the so-called ‘lost opportunity thesis’ which argues that an irrationally anti-Communist United States rejected friendly overtures from Ho Chi Minh during the 1940s and 50s thus driving the Vietnamese Communists into the arms of Beijing and Moscow. Citing copious textual evidence, Tuong Vu rejects this thesis, arguing that the zealous ideological partisanship of the Vietnamese leadership at the time made an alliance with America unlikely in the extreme. Goscha and Holcombe support Tuong’s Vu’s rejection of the ‘lost opportunity thesis,’ with Goscha noting that a similar argument about a lost American opportunity in communist China has been called convincingly into question by scholars such as Chen Jian.[1] Quinn-Judge and Tønnesson, on the other hand, continue to endorse ‘the lost opportunity thesis,’ with Quinn-Judge arguing that it was American intransience that radicalized the DRV.

A second issue over which reviewers disagree is Tuong Vu’s argument about internal factionalism within the Communist leadership. For Tuong Vu, factionalism in the Party has been overrated, as has a theory that the leadership was split between a moderate nationalist wing headed by Ho Chi Minh and a radical, internationalist wing led by Le Duan. Calling into question the characterization of Ho Chi Minh as a moderate nationalist, Tuong Vu suggests that what is most striking about the Vietnamese Communists was their shared commitment to the same overarching ideological project.   With some minor caveats, Holcombe endorses this interpretation adding that doves inflate the significance of factionalism within the Vietnamese Communist leadership for two instrumental reasons: it evokes the presence of moderate Communist elites who deserved American support and it heightens a contrast between a flexible, moderate Ho Chi Minh and a rigid extremist United States. Quinn-Judge and Tønnesson remain unconvinced by this revisionist argument.  The former argues that Ho Chi Minh was a moderate pragmatist with a strong nationalist streak. The latter attempts to resuscitate the fifty-year old interpretive scheme advanced by Huynh Kim Khanh which highlighted a conflict between ‘national patriots’ (led by Ho Chi Minh) and ‘proletarian internationalists’ (ultimately the Le Duan and Le Duc Tho faction).[2]

Contributors to the Forum raise additional questions and concerns. In response to Tuong Vu’s analysis of ‘factional divides within the party’ during the latter stages of the War, Goscha requests more historiography through additional engagement with the work of scholars who hold differing views. Holcombe attributes greater significance to Ho Chi Minh’s struggles with rivals in the 1930s and he disputes Tuong Vu’s optimistic speculation that the War was ‘winnable’ for the RVN. He also questions Tuong Vu’s conclusions about the ‘rationality’ of Hanoi’s post-war foreign policy. Quinn-Judge and Tønnesson question the book more aggressively. Quinn-Judge challenges its mono-causal explanatory framework and its static portrayal of Communist ideology. She restates her essentially sympathetic interpretation of Ho Chi Minh as a moderate, pragmatic nationalist, an argument of Tønnesson’s as well. Tønnesson rejects Tuong Vu’s overly rigid view of Communist ideology which, he claims, changed over time and included space for the expression of diverse positions.  He also argues that patriotism, not Communism, “carried the greatest normative weight for Vietnam’s Communist leaders.”

The critiques of Quinn-Judge and Tønnesson affirm the durability of divisions that date back fifty years. But they also introduce little new concrete evidence to back up their claims. This contrasts with the massive excavation of primary source material carried by Tuong Vu. Owing to his prodigious labors, the weight of the empirical record tips significantly in favor of his revisionist thesis.

Jean-Gabriel Périot, Alain Brossat : Ce que peux le cinéma [parution]

[ndlr] Parution aux éditions La découverte d’un ouvrage qui questionne les images cinématographiques, la mémoire et l’histoire. Conversation entre Jean-Gabriel Périot, cinéaste et réalisateur de films documentaires, et Alain Brossat, philosophe. Un ouvrage au programme du séminaire Mémoires d’Indochine de cette année 2018-2019. Présentation de l’éditeur.

Jean-Gabriel Périot, cinéaste, et Alain Brossat, professeur de philosophie, ont travaillé pendant des années, sans se connaître, sur des sujets communs : les femmes tondues à la Libération, l’univers carcéral, la violence politique, le désastre nucléaire…

Dans la réflexion qu’ils engagent ici, ils s’interrogent sur la relation que les images entretiennent avec la politique et l’histoire. Comment se fabrique la mémoire ? Comment appréhender les archives ? Comment remonter le temps, au sens historique et cinématographique du terme ?

Ces conversations s’appuient sur les expériences, et les expérimentations, de Jean-Gabriel Périot. Aiguillonné par les observations d’Alain Brossat, il explique comment il confectionne ses « tracts cinématographiques », comment il a travaillé avec les détenus d’une prison d’Orléans, comment il a monté les films inédits des militants de la Fraction armée rouge (RAF) ou encore comment il a remonté les images d’une apocalypse nucléaire, en commençant… par la fin.

Mettant en regard ces expériences avec celles d’autres cinéastes, célèbres ou non, ce dialogue offre une réflexion inédite sur le travail cinématographique et pose en termes nouveaux la question de la puissance – et de l’impuissance – de l’écriture et de l’image.

Source : La Découverte