Tous les articles par indomemoires

Norodom Sihanouk, la clef politique de l’émergence des Khmers rouges

[ndlr] Le documentaire de Gilles Cayatte réalisé en 2008 intitulé “Les 9 vies de Norodom Sihanouk” retrace le parcours politique du roi du Cambodge à travers un portrait sans concession. Ce documentaire permet de mieux comprendre les causes politiques qui ont permis l’émergence des Khmers rouges. A voir sur la chaîne You Tube de Gabriel Valmont.

Avec les commentaires de :
Jacques Bekaert, David Chandler, Alain Daniel, Princesse Buppha Devi (fille de Sihanouk), Kek Galabru, John Gunther Dean, Julio Jeldres, Suon Kaset, Jean Lacouture, François Ponchaud, Sam Rainsy, Chak Sarik, Norodom Sihanouk, Son Soubert, Saumura Tioulong…

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Documentaire
Durée : 52′
Auteur-réalisateur : Gilles Cayatte
Production : France 5 / Alegria / INA
Année : 2008

Lundi 23 février 2009 à 20.35 (première diffusion sur France 5)

Alors que le 17 février s’ouvre au Cambodge le procès tant attendu de Douch, ex-responsable du centre de torture S-21 poursuivi pour crimes de guerre et crimes contre l’humanité, ce documentaire retrace la vie de Norodom Sihanouk, qui a épousé la destinée du Cambodge.

Roi, demi-dieu, père de l’indépendance, simple citoyen devenu prince, chef d’Etat, Premier ministre, exilé, prisonnier… au cours de sa très longue vie politique, Norodom Sihanouk a endossé tous ces costumes. Au total, neuf vies que Gilles Cayatte a choisi de raconter, qui correspondent à autant d’époques, de ruptures, de choix, de stratégies, subis ou adoptés par Sihanouk et qui ont écrit l’histoire de son pays. Cet homme est aujourd’hui le dernier survivant d’une époque, celle de la fin du colonialisme. Il a traversé toutes les épreuves, tous les courants.

Un parcours fait d’ombre et de lumière

Pour raconter ce parcours hors du commun, fait d’ombre et de lumière, le réalisateur a recueilli de nombreux témoignages de proches, de conseillers, de journalistes. Il donne à nouveau la parole à Norodom Sihanouk à travers de multiples extraits d’interviews. Parmi les archives utilisées apparaissent pour la première fois des archives cambodgiennes longtemps conservées à Phnom Penh. Le film montre comment il n’a jamais abandonné et combien il a toujours été adoré par le peuple cambodgien. En pleine guerre d’Indochine, ce « roi d’opérette », sous la tutelle des Français, négocie l’indépendance du Cambodge sans qu’une goutte de sang ne soit versée.

Pour préserver et construire son pays, il joue sur les tensions et les luttes de pouvoir. Selon les époques, les circonstances, il s’appuie sur la Chine, l’Amérique, la France, la Russie. Mais, renversé en mars 1970 par le général pro-américain Lon Nol, il n’est plus maître du jeu. Il s’allie alors aux ennemis communistes d’hier. De 1975 à 1979, l’horreur khmère rouge planifiée par Pol Pot fait environ 1 million et demi de victimes et ne l’épargne pas. Prisonnier puis exilé, il doit attendre la libération du Cambodge par le Vietnam, puis la fin de l’occupation vietnamienne, douze ans plus tard, pour rentrer dans un pays enfin en paix.

Valentine Ponsy (France 5).

L’année 1972 vue « d’en bas » – Traces et mémoires de neuf mois de bombardements sur Hanoi

Table-ronde organisée et animée par Olivier Tessier (EFEO) – 08 nov. 2012 – 18h00 – Auditorium de L’Espace à Hanoi

Participants : Mme Huyen Mermet (Dao Thanh Huyen) et M. Dang Duc Tue, jour­na­lis­tes et co-auteurs de « Dien Bien Phu vu d’enface » (Paris, Nouveau Monde éditions, 2010).

L’ate­lier por­tera sur la vie des habi­tants de Hanoi et du Nord Vietnam (RDVN) pen­dant la guerre du Vietnam. Ce tra­vail est le fruit d’une enquête de terrain réalisée sur près de 100 témoins ayant vécu les 12 jours et nuits de bom­bar­de­ments aériens à Hanoi en 1972.

Traduction simultanée
Entrée libre

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Vivre et mourir à Hanoi en 1972

Exposition organisée et coordonnée par Olivier Tessier (EFEO) – 11 oct./09 nov. 2012 – Hall d’exposition de L’Espace

La vie quotidienne à Hanoi sous les bombes en 1972.

L’Exposition vous présente aussi chronologiquement l’enchaînement des phases de bombardements (cibles stratégiques, forces aériennes engagées, destructions et victimes civiles et militaires) ainsi que le processus des négociations parallèles.

Vernissage :
11.10 – 18h00
Exposition :
11.10>09.11

Entrée libre

Pour voir le programme, double clic sur l’image ci-dessous.

Séminaire “Mémoires d’Indochine” : Séance 4

Année universitaire 2012-2013 / Master Asie Orientale Contemporaine (ASIOC) / Semestre 1

 

Mémoires d’Indochine :

Regards internes sur la décolonisation et la guerre

au Viêt-Nam, Laos et Cambodge

 

Séance 4 – vendredi 19 octobre 2012

« Expériences de guerres en Indochine »

(1945-1993)

 

Cette séance sera consacrée aux multiples expériences de guerre en Indochine : guerre urbaine, jungle, guérilla, mobilisation, corps en situation, comportements et psychologie des combattants. A l’appui de deux exemples très différents, la guerre du Viêt-Nam vue du Nord et du Sud, vue de la jungle ou de la ville, sera questionnée.

 

Extraits de textes à discuter :

  • LE CAO DAI, C’était au Tây Nguyên. Journal de guerre d’un chirurgien nord-vietnamien 1965-1973 , Hanoi, Editions The Gioi, 2006, ch. III (pp. 75-123) [+ dos de couverture]. Traduction de Nguyen Thi Nga avec la participation de Pierre Darruillat.
  • NHA CA, Les canons tonnent la nuit, Arles, Editions Philippe Picquier, 1997, pp. 13-22, 103-111, 129-150 [+ dos de couverture]. Roman traduit du vietnamien par Liêu Truong.

 

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Exposés oraux :

 

Pour aller plus loin dans la réflexion :

  • Audoin-Rouzeau, Stéphane, Combattre. Une anthropologie historique de la guerre moderne (XIXe- XXIe siècles), Paris, Editions du Seuil, Les livres du nouveau monde, 2008.
  • Capdevilla, Luc & al., Hommes et femmes dans la France en guerre (1914-1945), Paris, Editions Payot & Rivages, 2003. (de Luc Capdevilla, François Rouquet, Fabrice Virgili et Danièle Voldman).

Mort de l’ancien roi du Cambodge Norodom Sihanouk – RFI

© AP

Par RFI – Norodom Sihanouk est décédé lundi 15 octobre 2012 [1] à Pékin à l’âge de 89 ans. La nouvelle a été délivrée par l’agence Chine-Nouvelle, qui n’a pas donné plus de précision. L’ancien souverain venait régulièrement en Chine pour y recevoir des soins. dans un communiqué, Pékin déplore le décès d’un «grand ami». Sihanouk, dont le règne avait été l’un des plus longs d’Asie, est considéré comme l’un des pères fondateurs de la Francophonie et du Mouvement des non-alignés.

C’est un monument de l’histoire du XXe siècle qui vient de s’éteindre. « Sihanouk est le Cambodge », considère tout bonnement son biographe officiel Julio Jeldres. Cinéaste, journaliste, compositeur, poète, demi-dieu pour les siens, Norodom Sihanouk était en fait et surtout un animal politique, le souverain qui aura perdu et retrouvé son trône à deux reprises. Un personnage déroutant et ambigu.

Pour l’Agence France-Presse, « pendant plus de 50 ans, le petit homme au caractère souvent déconcertant et à la voix haut perchée, grand amateur de champagne et de foie gras, (…) s’est déployé inlassablement sur la scène diplomatique internationale en dépit d’une carrière à éclipses ».

Né le 31 octobre 1922 à Phnom-Penh, il n’a pas 20 ans lorsque la France coloniale, en 1941, le choisit pour succéder à son grand-père. Il obtient sa couronne de roi avec l’aval du gouverneur général d’Indochine, l’amiral Jean Decoux.

Dans les années 1950, après la brève incursion japonaise dans les affaires indochinoises puis le retour des Français, le jeune monarque goûte à la gestion politique à proprement parler, en véritable chef de gouvernement. Il se lance alors dans la première œuvre de sa vie : la « croisade royale pour l’Indépendance », qui porte enfin ses fruits en 1953, sans violence.

Libérateur de son peuple, Norodom Sihanouk consacre alors le reste de sa vie à la politique. En 1955, il cède sa couronne à son père mais garde le pouvoir, et peaufine sa stratégie de neutralité entre les deux blocs. Il est en première ligne entre 1955 et 1956, au côté de l’Egyptien Nasser, du Yougoslave Tito, de l’Indonésien Soekarno et de l’Indien Nehru, pour lancer le Mouvement des pays non-alignés. Il dirige son pays sans opposition jusqu’en 1969, sur la base d’un vaste rassemblement royaliste et socialiste.

Les années 1960 constituent une période d’alliances plus affirmées. Le monarque se rapproche d’abord du bloc de l’URSS, puis de la Chine à la fin de la décennie. Le général de Gaulle est reçu à Phnom-Penh en 1966. C’est également au début des années 1960, au côté des colonies africaines fraîchement libérées (la Tunisie de Habib Bourguiba, le Niger de Hamani Diori et le Sénégal de Léopold Sédar Senghor) que le Cambodgien milite pour que la communauté linguistique francophone, auquel il attache une grande importance, se dote d’institutions intergouvernementales durables.

La suite de l’histoire de Norodom Sihanouk est digne d’un roman, tandis que le pays s’enfonce dans l’instabilité. Le roi perd son trône en 1970, s’installe en Chine, récupère le titre de chef d’Etat en 1975 au côté des Khmers rouges (dans une alliance improbable avec Pol Pot), avant de démissionner un an plus tard, d’être placé en résidence surveillée par ses alliés, puis de fuir en Corée du Nord à leur chute.

Dix ans plus tard, après plusieurs années d’activisme international, il revient au pays en héros, fort d’avoir obtenu la signature des accords de paix de Paris en 1991. Il reprend sa place en 1993. Et en 2004, Norodom Sihanouk abdique une dernière fois, en faveur de son fils Sihamoni, invoquant son âge et des raisons de santé.

Pendant les onze dernières années de son règne, il aura vu grandir, impuissant, l’influence du Premier ministre Hun Sen et de son fils Norodom Ranariddh, président de l’Assemblée nationale. Après son retrait, il continuera de donner de ses nouvelles et publie ses observations sur la vie publique par internet. Parfois avec humour, comme le pointe notre correspondant à Pékin, Stéphane Lagarde. Ainsi Norodom Sihanouk déclarait, en 2005 sur internet, «se porter de mieux en mieux», tout en présentant «ses plus humbles excuses à toutes les personnes qui souhaitent sa mort». Ses proches faisaient alors l’objet de vives attaques de la part du Premier ministre Hun Sen.

En 2009, après six mariages, une nombreuse progéniture (dont une partie décimée par les Khmers rouges) Norodom Sihanouk écrit : « cette trop longue longévité me pèse comme un poids insupportable ».

Source : RFI (Radio France Internationale)

A lire dans les archives de RFI : « Sihanouk : l’histoire du roi qui abdiqua deux fois »

  • Lire son portrait sur TV5 Monde : “Norodom Sihanouk : père de l’indépendance cambodgienne… et de la francophonie”

[1] France Info annonce le décès dans une nouvelle publiée le dimanche 14 octobre à 23:53.

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Le Cambodge en deuil après la mort de N. Sihanouk (Euronews 15-10-2012)

UQÀM 2012 – La guerre d’Indochine 1945-1956 : un outil multidisciplinaire

[ndlr] Le nouvel outil multidisciplinaire sur la Guerre d’Indochine mis en place par l’UQÀM vient de voir le jour. Il propose dès à présent l’accès à l’intégralité du dictionnaire historique de Christopher E. Goscha (NIAS, 2011), un instrument de travail indispensable sur ce sujet. D’autres développements de ce nouveau site sont à prévoir dans les semaines qui viennent. A consulter donc sans modération. Texte de la page d’accueil du site ci-après.

Bienvenue sur le site destiné à la Guerre d’Indochine de l’Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM). Ce projet met à disposition de nombreux outils fiables afin que les spécialistes, les enseignants, les étudiants ainsi que le grand public puissent mieux comprendre la complexité de ce conflit. Il a bénéficié du financement du Conseil de recherche en sciences humaines du Canada ainsi que du soutien institutionnel de l’UQÀM, de son département d’histoire et de la collaboration du Professeur David Marr de l’Australian National University. Bien que Christopher Goscha soit le responsable du projet, Phi-Vân Nguyen, avec l’assistance de Simon Abdela, en est l’auteur principal. Tous nos remerciements vont également vers Jean-François Tremblay, Nathalie Lavoie et René Lê Minh Cuong du Service de l’audiovisuel de l’UQÀM.

Dans la mesure où ce projet demeure en chantier, plusieurs parties du site, notamment la chronologie et la bibliographie, ne sont pas encore complétées. Cependant, puisque la publication en ligne permet une mise à jour facile et régulière des informations, nous avons décidé de dévoiler au public notre projet en l’état actuel, dans l’espoir qu’il puisse déjà être utile aux lecteurs. Bien sûr, nous recevons très volontiers toute suggestion ou correction qui nous permettra d’améliorer notre travail. Veuillez contacter Christopher Goscha (site internet) à l’adresse goscha.christopher@uqam.ca.

Lien du Dictionnaire (cliquez sur l’image).

Ha Mai Viet : Steel and Blood – South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia [2] – two book reviews

Ha Mai Viet, Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2008, 459 p.

Book Review by LtCol Raymond A. Stewart, USMC (Ret).

 

Colonel Ha Mai Viet provides his meticulously researched, impressively written and well-presented book about South Vietnam tanks in “Steel and Blood.” The author details the combat history of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Armor (AF) from “Ferocious Battles, 1963-68” through “Vietnamization, 1969-74” to the final days of the Republic in 1975—“The Capture of South Vietnam.” His is a riveting account of tank battle after tank battle, pitting the ARVNAF’s M41 and M48 tanks against the NVA enemy’s T54, T59, T34 and PT76 tanks.

Somewhat of a surprise to a Marine Corps Vietnam tanker—and possible Army armor as well—and for certain to those who declared that Vietnam was not “tank country” are the numbers and types of armored vehicles employed by both sides and the importance the VC/NVA enemy and ARVN alike placed on the use of armored vehicles in general and tanks specifically. Just one example: By 1975, the NVA had an estimated 600 T54s in or on the border of South Vietnam supplied by large, well-concealed fuel lines with sophisticated pumping and fueling stations that ran through Laos and Cambodia hundreds of kilometers from Haiphong in the north.

In battle after battle, from the Plain of Reeds through the three-front General Offensive and battles for the Central High­lands to the final assault on Saigon itself, Col Ha Mai Viet provides the reader with the often heart-wrenchingly candid and unwashed details of bloody victories and even more horrific defeats. He does not embellish the value of the ARVNAF in its successful fights nor does he minimize the faults of senior leaderships’ failed decisions contributing to catastrophic defeats. The author keeps to the rapid movement of armor and the battles in which tanks participate by extracting related details and placing them in “Notes.” There are 80 pages of notes, which add an impressive dimension of understanding of ARVNAF leadership, or lack of it.

In the second half of the book, the “Mil­itary History” segment, Col Ha Mai Viet’s attention to detail and in-depth research provide the reader the historical background of the ARVN in general terms and, more specifically, trace the establishment, growth and deployment of the armored forces (ARVNAF).

While certainly not the “grabber” that one finds in page after page of Part I, Part II is of significant value in understanding the development, structure, employment, logistics and administration of ARVNAF in terms of equipment. The author provides interesting information on the back­ground and training of the armored personnel and quite candid comments on the ARVNAF leadership.

To follow the battles, I found the paucity of maps—there are just two small-detail maps—made the reading (and enjoyment) of the book somewhat difficult. Also, com­mand structure, order of battle, and table of organization and equipment diagrams would have greatly helped in better understanding of the material.

Col. Ha Mai Viet states unequivocally that South Vietnam could have defeated the VC/NVA on the battlefield had the Uni­ted States made good on its agreement to support the South after the withdrawal of American ground forces.

This thoroughly researched book, a 10-year effort, relies on both personal knowledge and interviews of hundreds of former ARVN as well as VC/NVA soldiers and officers of all ranks and military occupational specialties. To obtain a more balanced view—and with an armored slant—of the war that took more than 58,000 American lives, this book is a highly recommended read.

Source : Leatherneck, magazine of the Marines, Marine Corps Association.

Présentation de l’ouvrage sur U.S. Naval Institute.

* * *

Book Review by Jay Veith.

Of the several thousand tomes published about the Vietnam War, only a few English-language viewpoints written by our Vietnamese allies grace the bookshelves. The South Vietnamese perspective, constrained by cultural and linguistic barriers, is unfortunately marginalized in the war’s literature for Americans. Due to these barriers, U.S. historians, even if interested in South Vietnamese motivations and actions, are left with little except military adviser reports, obscure embassy cables, or shallow news articles. Thus reduced to bit players, the South Vietnamese have become caricatures; either cowardly incompetents or corrupt warlords, with an occasional brave soul or hard-fighting unit briefly mentioned. A more balanced and deeper picture of America’s wartime partner has long been needed.

Former armor Colonel Ha Mai Viet has offered precisely that, a penetrating insight into the battlefield contributions of the South Vietnamese tank officers who fought alongside their American friends. His book details the contributions of a small but influential element of the ARVN, its armor/cavalry forces. Unknown to most, by war’s end the armor branch had grown considerably from its French roots. In 1975, Brigadier General Tran Quang Khoi’s 3rd Armored Cavalry Brigade, the III Corps organic tank unit, was undoubtedly the most powerful brigade-size element in the ARVN. Reflecting a rare combined arms outlook, Khoi built a formidable combat out-fit from previously independent armor, artillery, engineer, and ranger units. His merged brigade was still defending outside of Saigon when the final surrender came.

Viet spent ten years traveling the globe, tracking down and interviewing many of his former comrades-in-arms. He portrays the heroic deeds of his fellow soldiers while unflinchingly condemning South Vietnamese leadership errors. Covering two main topics, Combat and Military History, Viet outlines twenty-three separate battles from the ARVN side. The bulk of the Combat section covers the Tet Offensive, Lam Son 719, the Easter Offensive, and the bloody retreat in 1975 from the Central Highlands. He also provides rich details on unknown battles such as the terrible clash at Dambe in Cambodia in 1971. The Military History part provides unique facts on the formation and growth of the ARVN armor/cavalry branch from 1954 to 1975, including unit commanders, weapons, and organizational structure.

Brilliantly translated, no future work on Vietnam battles will be complete without reviewing this publication. Colonel Viet has provided a tremendous amount of fresh information, almost all of it oral history. That is the strength and weakness of the book. Like all interviews, the ones in this book only provide the participant’s side. For example, the account by Colonel Nguyen Van Dong concerning the Central Highlands retreat, while new and highly informative, perpetuates the myth that Brigadier General Pham Duy Tat, the II Corps Ranger Commander, was responsible for the convoy on Route 7B. Tat, when presented with Dong’s remarks, categorically denied the accusations, a point of view absent from Viet’s book. This is not to cast fault, as Viet was only interested in the stories of his armor colleagues. Yet without access to That’s perspective, the unsuspecting historian would perpetuate the story. Unfortunately, as General Cao Van Vien once told the reviewer, the war remains much like the movie “Rashomon”: the truth is subjective to the individual. Colonel Viet nevertheless deserves enormous credit for his industrious research and fine account. His is a major and much needed addition to the history of the Vietnam War.

Copyright © 2009 Society for Military History
Project MUSE® – View Citation
Réf. :

  • Jay Veith. “Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia (review).” The Journal of Military History 73.3 (2009): 1020-1021. Project MUSE. Web. 27 Dec. 2011. <http://muse.jhu.edu/>.
  •  Veith, J.(2009). Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia (review). The Journal of Military History 73(3), 1020-1021. Society for Military History.

Ha Mai Viet : Steel and Blood – South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia [1]

Ha Mai Viet, Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2008, 459 p., $40.00 USD, ISBN: 978-1591149194.

Book Review by Dr J.R. McKay.

 

Ha Mai Viet’s Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia is an ambitious work. The author tried to produce both a history of the armoured branch of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam[1] (ARVN) and a history of the armoured branch’s unit’s roles on the ARVN’s battles with the Vietnamese Communist forces. While South Vietnam, and by default the ARVN, and its armoured branch lasted for only twenty years, this was a nation and an army that fought against its enemies for most of that time.[2]

Steel and Blood is effectively two smaller books in one. The first part is a “Combat History” of the armoured branch’s participation in battles as well as a narrative of the war from an ARVN perspective. The second part of the book, “Military History,” is a summary of the organizational history of the South Vietnamese Armor Corps, a compendium of information on that branch and a comparison of its equipment with that of its North Vietnamese counterpart.

The combat history describes a series of battles from 1963 to 1975, based upon ARVN’s battles with the Communists. It starts with an orientation on the role of the armoured branch’s units in a series of battles, but slowly transforms into a general narrative on the progress of the war. Colonel Viet tried to tell the tale of what happened, balancing between what he stated that he sought to do and providing the proverbial “bigger picture.” While this might frustrate some readers, some observations merit mention.

First, one should keep in mind that he has provided a glimpse into a perspective that is often overlooked. The common narrative with regard to the ARVN has been that it was overly oriented on the byzantine politics of Saigon and insufficiently focused on waging counter-insurgency operations until 1968, when the Tet Offensive led to the development of a more combat-oriented ethos. Colonel Viet’s book points out that a number of ARVN units often fought harder than was realized at the time or since despite the political proclivities of some of the ARVN’s general officers.[3]

Second, the author left one with the distinct impression that ARVN units tended to view their advisors less as sources of advice than sources of firepower. One gets the sense that during the earlier years, in some cases, ARVN officers may have resented advice from the technically sound yet less experienced advisors. The perception of advisors as sources of firepower appears to have become more acute after the 1972 Easter Offensive. The Nixon Administration’s policy of “Vietnamization” meant the phased withdrawal of American combat forces and increasingly shifting the burden of combat onto the ARVN. The Nixon Administration could not reverse this trend for domestic political reasons and sought to make greater use of air power as a result. This is a potential lesson for those destined for advisory duties; those being advised may be more interested in one’s capacity to influence the battle than one’s advice on how to do same.

Third, the book leaves one with the distinct impression that as the Communists made the transition from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare, the importance of ARVN’s armoured branch increased. The early battles described organizations analogous to reconnaissance squadrons conducting economy of force operations against the Viet Cong; the later battles described ARVN tanks duelling with the North Vietnamese counterparts. Indeed, the Communist fielding of T-54 equipped units prompted the ARVN’s fielding of a number of M-48 “Patton” equipped units to cope with the threat. This also supports a broader point about the nature of insurgencies. The endgame of any insurgency is to set the conditions for assuring victory once conventional warfare begins. Colonel Viet’s accounts of battle start with clashes with the Viet Cong guerrillas in the mid 1960s and ends with tank battles between the North Vietnamese Army and the ARVN.

This section of the book, unfortunately, was at times difficult to follow. The author sought to describe both operational and tactical actions without maps, but made references to a series of place names. While there was an appendix providing general maps of South Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh trail, the inclusion of a series of smaller maps that showed the location and how the battles occurred would have helped clarify the “combat history.” Throughout this section, one was tempted to read the “military history” to get a sense of the evolution of the armoured branch’s organizations before linking it to their combat performance.

The military history was a collection of related topics designed to inform the reader about the war, the armoured branch’s evolution and its equipment. Again, the ARVN perspective was enlightening and it allows one to see the conflict through Vietnamese, albeit Southern, eyes, as opposed to the American or French perspectives. The organizational history began with the Vietnamese National Army of 1950, which was the army raised by the French within Vietnam during the war with the Viet Minh. The ARVN’s armoured branch’s roots lay in the creation of a series of reconnaissance platoons in 1950, which coalesced into companies[4] in 1951, battalions by 1953 and regiments by 1954. After the Vietnamese National Army became the ARVN in 1955, these reconnaissance regiments became armoured cavalry regiments, four armoured regiments, a school and an amphibious group. In this period, they were equipped with Second World War era equipment cast off by the French that had been donated by the United States. During the 1960s, the older equipment was replaced by M113 armoured personnel carriers and M-41 “Bulldog” tanks.[5]

The book describes the 1960s as a developmental period where the armoured branch began to specialize more. Armoured cavalry companies were the most common unit, but the branch also began to field reconnaissance and tank companies as well. Indeed, the book left one with the impression that the ARVN armoured branch fought most frequently as companies within larger entities. Indeed, the ambitious combination of the “combat history” and the “military history” was most useful in illuminating such matters. Colonel Viet followed this discussion of the evolution of the branch’s units with a compendium of facts. This had the effect of breaking a logical sequence of information in order to provide a series of interesting yet esoteric facts. He identified every commander of an ARVN armoured unit from the troop to the brigade level, the surgeons, and provided an account of their reunion at Fort Knox in 2000. Unfortunately, the multiple sources of information made this section, and indeed the book, seem less of a general history than a sourcebook or compendium of facts about the ARVN armoured branch.

Ha Mai Viet was a South Vietnamese Armor corps officer who served for 21 years, retiring as a Colonel. During that time, he had served in a number of different positions within armoured units, but his two most noteworthy positions were as an Assistant Division Commander and as the chief of the Quang Tri province.6 This meant he had fought the Communists for at least twelve years before leaving his country in its final days. His patriotism and pride in his military have been reflected in his writing. In addition, he wrote some of the accounts of specific battles from a personal perspective. Readers should take these points in mind before passing judgement on the book’s value.

Readers may be wondering what value a book about a nation that vanished a quarter century ago may have today. What can the ARVN’s experience tell us today? Is it relevant for the Canadian Forces in the early 21st century? The short answer to such questions is yes; however, this depends upon one’s perspective and interests. Those interested in comparing the evolution of different armoured branches may also wish to read those parts of the book. One should note that the ARVN’s approach to combat development was based upon trial and error in battle; they did not have the luxury of time to consider their organizations in great detail. Furthermore, reading the ARVN perspective may give pause for thought for those destined for advisory duties about what those being advised may be thinking.

Dr J.R. McKay

Endnotes

1. The RVN is better known as South Vietnam.

2. Many readers will no doubt be aware of the American participation in the war, spanning from 1964 to 1973 and the end of the war between North and South Vietnam (1973-1975), however, many may not be aware that South Vietnam had to contend with several armed groups in its infancy in 1955 and coup attempts from within the ARVN. The Communist insurgency began in South Vietnam in 1957 and North Vietnam began to provide support to that insurgency in 1959. A year later, the North Vietnamese sought to see all armed resistance groups in South Vietnam coalesce into the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLF). Readers may recognize the other, slightly inaccurate, name for the NLF—the Viet Cong. The ARVN began fighting [?]

3. There are two examples of this phenomenon. The author defends the actions and decisions of ARVN tactical commanders at the Battle of Ap Bac (January 1963) and the President’s direction that contributed to the disaster in Operation LAM SON 719 (January 1971). For details, see: Ha Mai Viet, former Colonel, ARVN, Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armour and the War for Southeast Asia, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2008), 16-17 and 84. For examples of the criticism levelled on those two incidents, see: Lieutenant General Phillip B. Davidson, U.S. Army, Retired, Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975, (Novato: Presidio, 1988), 573-604, and Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam, (New York: Random House, 1988), 203-265.

4. Readers should be aware that due to the influence of the U.S. Army, the ARVN armoured branch used the term “Troop” to describe subunit-sized organizations and the term “Squadron” for unitsized organizations. This review uses the generic Canadian Army terminology of “company” and “battalion.”

5. The M-41 “Bulldog” came into American service during the Korean War and entered ARVN service in 1964. It weighed 24 tons, its main armament was 76 mm, it had 12 to 38 mm of armour, and it could reach speeds of 72 km/h.

6. This province was in Military Region 1 / I Corps Tactical Zone, just south of the Demilitarized Zone. He left South Vietnam in 1975, during the final days of that country.

Source : Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 12.1 Spring 2009, pp. 123-125 (pdf).

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2009