Table-ronde organisée et animée par Olivier Tessier (EFEO) – 08 nov. 2012 – 18h00 – Auditorium de L’Espace à Hanoi
Participants : Mme Huyen Mermet (Dao Thanh Huyen) et M. Dang Duc Tue, journalistes et co-auteurs de « Dien Bien Phu vu d’enface » (Paris, Nouveau Monde éditions, 2010).
L’atelier portera sur la vie des habitants de Hanoi et du Nord Vietnam (RDVN) pendant la guerre du Vietnam. Ce travail est le fruit d’une enquête de terrain réalisée sur près de 100 témoins ayant vécu les 12 jours et nuits de bombardements aériens à Hanoi en 1972.
* * *
Vivre et mourir à Hanoi en 1972
Exposition organisée et coordonnée par Olivier Tessier (EFEO) – 11 oct./09 nov. 2012 – Hall d’exposition de L’Espace
La vie quotidienne à Hanoi sous les bombes en 1972.
L’Exposition vous présente aussi chronologiquement l’enchaînement des phases de bombardements (cibles stratégiques, forces aériennes engagées, destructions et victimes civiles et militaires) ainsi que le processus des négociations parallèles.
Regards internes sur la décolonisation et la guerre
au Viêt-Nam, Laos et Cambodge
Séance 4 – vendredi 19 octobre 2012
« Expériences de guerres en Indochine »
Cette séance sera consacrée aux multiples expériences de guerre en Indochine : guerre urbaine, jungle, guérilla, mobilisation, corps en situation, comportements et psychologie des combattants. A l’appui de deux exemples très différents, la guerre du Viêt-Nam vue du Nord et du Sud, vue de la jungle ou de la ville, sera questionnée.
Extraits de textes à discuter :
LE CAO DAI, C’était au Tây Nguyên. Journal de guerre d’un chirurgien nord-vietnamien 1965-1973 , Hanoi, Editions The Gioi, 2006, ch. III (pp. 75-123) [+ dos de couverture]. Traduction de Nguyen Thi Nga avec la participation de Pierre Darruillat.
NHA CA, Les canons tonnent la nuit, Arles, Editions Philippe Picquier, 1997, pp. 13-22, 103-111, 129-150 [+ dos de couverture]. Roman traduit du vietnamien par Liêu Truong.
Par RFI – Norodom Sihanouk est décédé lundi 15 octobre 2012  à Pékin à l’âge de 89 ans. La nouvelle a été délivrée par l’agence Chine-Nouvelle, qui n’a pas donné plus de précision. L’ancien souverain venait régulièrement en Chine pour y recevoir des soins. dans un communiqué, Pékin déplore le décès d’un «grand ami». Sihanouk, dont le règne avait été l’un des plus longs d’Asie, est considéré comme l’un des pères fondateurs de la Francophonie et du Mouvement des non-alignés.
C’est un monument de l’histoire du XXe siècle qui vient de s’éteindre. « Sihanouk est le Cambodge », considère tout bonnement son biographe officiel Julio Jeldres. Cinéaste, journaliste, compositeur, poète, demi-dieu pour les siens, Norodom Sihanouk était en fait et surtout un animal politique, le souverain qui aura perdu et retrouvé son trône à deux reprises. Un personnage déroutant et ambigu.
Pour l’Agence France-Presse, « pendant plus de 50 ans, le petit homme au caractère souvent déconcertant et à la voix haut perchée, grand amateur de champagne et de foie gras, (…) s’est déployé inlassablement sur la scène diplomatique internationale en dépit d’une carrière à éclipses ».
Né le 31 octobre 1922 à Phnom-Penh, il n’a pas 20 ans lorsque la France coloniale, en 1941, le choisit pour succéder à son grand-père. Il obtient sa couronne de roi avec l’aval du gouverneur général d’Indochine, l’amiral Jean Decoux.
Dans les années 1950, après la brève incursion japonaise dans les affaires indochinoises puis le retour des Français, le jeune monarque goûte à la gestion politique à proprement parler, en véritable chef de gouvernement. Il se lance alors dans la première œuvre de sa vie : la « croisade royale pour l’Indépendance », qui porte enfin ses fruits en 1953, sans violence.
Libérateur de son peuple, Norodom Sihanouk consacre alors le reste de sa vie à la politique. En 1955, il cède sa couronne à son père mais garde le pouvoir, et peaufine sa stratégie de neutralité entre les deux blocs. Il est en première ligne entre 1955 et 1956, au côté de l’Egyptien Nasser, du Yougoslave Tito, de l’Indonésien Soekarno et de l’Indien Nehru, pour lancer le Mouvement des pays non-alignés. Il dirige son pays sans opposition jusqu’en 1969, sur la base d’un vaste rassemblement royaliste et socialiste.
Les années 1960 constituent une période d’alliances plus affirmées. Le monarque se rapproche d’abord du bloc de l’URSS, puis de la Chine à la fin de la décennie. Le général de Gaulle est reçu à Phnom-Penh en 1966. C’est également au début des années 1960, au côté des colonies africaines fraîchement libérées (la Tunisie de Habib Bourguiba, le Niger de Hamani Diori et le Sénégal de Léopold Sédar Senghor) que le Cambodgien milite pour que la communauté linguistique francophone, auquel il attache une grande importance, se dote d’institutions intergouvernementales durables.
La suite de l’histoire de Norodom Sihanouk est digne d’un roman, tandis que le pays s’enfonce dans l’instabilité. Le roi perd son trône en 1970, s’installe en Chine, récupère le titre de chef d’Etat en 1975 au côté des Khmers rouges (dans une alliance improbable avec Pol Pot), avant de démissionner un an plus tard, d’être placé en résidence surveillée par ses alliés, puis de fuir en Corée du Nord à leur chute.
Dix ans plus tard, après plusieurs années d’activisme international, il revient au pays en héros, fort d’avoir obtenu la signature des accords de paix de Paris en 1991. Il reprend sa place en 1993. Et en 2004, Norodom Sihanouk abdique une dernière fois, en faveur de son fils Sihamoni, invoquant son âge et des raisons de santé.
Pendant les onze dernières années de son règne, il aura vu grandir, impuissant, l’influence du Premier ministre Hun Sen et de son fils Norodom Ranariddh, président de l’Assemblée nationale. Après son retrait, il continuera de donner de ses nouvelles et publie ses observations sur la vie publique par internet. Parfois avec humour, comme le pointe notre correspondant à Pékin, Stéphane Lagarde. AinsiNorodom Sihanouk déclarait, en 2005 sur internet, «se porter de mieux en mieux», tout en présentant «ses plus humbles excuses à toutes les personnes qui souhaitent sa mort». Ses proches faisaient alors l’objet de vives attaques de la part du Premier ministre Hun Sen.
En 2009, après six mariages, une nombreuse progéniture (dont une partie décimée par les Khmers rouges) Norodom Sihanouk écrit : « cette trop longue longévité me pèse comme un poids insupportable ».
[ndlr] Le nouvel outil multidisciplinaire sur la Guerre d’Indochine mis en place par l’UQÀM vient de voir le jour. Il propose dès à présent l’accès à l’intégralité du dictionnaire historique de Christopher E. Goscha (NIAS, 2011), un instrument de travail indispensable sur ce sujet. D’autres développements de ce nouveau site sont à prévoir dans les semaines qui viennent. A consulter donc sans modération. Texte de la page d’accueil du site ci-après.
Bienvenue sur le site destiné à la Guerre d’Indochine de l’Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM). Ce projet met à disposition de nombreux outils fiables afin que les spécialistes, les enseignants, les étudiants ainsi que le grand public puissent mieux comprendre la complexité de ce conflit. Il a bénéficié du financement du Conseil de recherche en sciences humaines du Canada ainsi que du soutien institutionnel de l’UQÀM, de son département d’histoire et de la collaboration du Professeur David Marr de l’Australian National University. Bien que Christopher Goscha soit le responsable du projet, Phi-Vân Nguyen, avec l’assistance de Simon Abdela, en est l’auteur principal. Tous nos remerciements vont également vers Jean-François Tremblay, Nathalie Lavoie et René Lê Minh Cuong du Service de l’audiovisuel de l’UQÀM.
Dans la mesure où ce projet demeure en chantier, plusieurs parties du site, notamment la chronologie et la bibliographie, ne sont pas encore complétées. Cependant, puisque la publication en ligne permet une mise à jour facile et régulière des informations, nous avons décidé de dévoiler au public notre projet en l’état actuel, dans l’espoir qu’il puisse déjà être utile aux lecteurs. Bien sûr, nous recevons très volontiers toute suggestion ou correction qui nous permettra d’améliorer notre travail. Veuillez contacter Christopher Goscha (site internet) à l’adresse firstname.lastname@example.org.
Ha Mai Viet, Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2008, 459 p.
Book Review by LtCol Raymond A. Stewart, USMC (Ret).
Colonel Ha Mai Viet provides his meticulously researched, impressively written and well-presented book about South Vietnam tanks in “Steel and Blood.” The author details the combat history of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Armor (AF) from “Ferocious Battles, 1963-68” through “Vietnamization, 1969-74” to the final days of the Republic in 1975—“The Capture of South Vietnam.” His is a riveting account of tank battle after tank battle, pitting the ARVNAF’s M41 and M48 tanks against the NVA enemy’s T54, T59, T34 and PT76 tanks.
Somewhat of a surprise to a Marine Corps Vietnam tanker—and possible Army armor as well—and for certain to those who declared that Vietnam was not “tank country” are the numbers and types of armored vehicles employed by both sides and the importance the VC/NVA enemy and ARVN alike placed on the use of armored vehicles in general and tanks specifically. Just one example: By 1975, the NVA had an estimated 600 T54s in or on the border of South Vietnam supplied by large, well-concealed fuel lines with sophisticated pumping and fueling stations that ran through Laos and Cambodia hundreds of kilometers from Haiphong in the north.
In battle after battle, from the Plain of Reeds through the three-front General Offensive and battles for the Central Highlands to the final assault on Saigon itself, Col Ha Mai Viet provides the reader with the often heart-wrenchingly candid and unwashed details of bloody victories and even more horrific defeats. He does not embellish the value of the ARVNAF in its successful fights nor does he minimize the faults of senior leaderships’ failed decisions contributing to catastrophic defeats. The author keeps to the rapid movement of armor and the battles in which tanks participate by extracting related details and placing them in “Notes.” There are 80 pages of notes, which add an impressive dimension of understanding of ARVNAF leadership, or lack of it.
In the second half of the book, the “Military History” segment, Col Ha Mai Viet’s attention to detail and in-depth research provide the reader the historical background of the ARVN in general terms and, more specifically, trace the establishment, growth and deployment of the armored forces (ARVNAF).
While certainly not the “grabber” that one finds in page after page of Part I, Part II is of significant value in understanding the development, structure, employment, logistics and administration of ARVNAF in terms of equipment. The author provides interesting information on the background and training of the armored personnel and quite candid comments on the ARVNAF leadership.
To follow the battles, I found the paucity of maps—there are just two small-detail maps—made the reading (and enjoyment) of the book somewhat difficult. Also, command structure, order of battle, and table of organization and equipment diagrams would have greatly helped in better understanding of the material.
Col. Ha Mai Viet states unequivocally that South Vietnam could have defeated the VC/NVA on the battlefield had the United States made good on its agreement to support the South after the withdrawal of American ground forces.
This thoroughly researched book, a 10-year effort, relies on both personal knowledge and interviews of hundreds of former ARVN as well as VC/NVA soldiers and officers of all ranks and military occupational specialties. To obtain a more balanced view—and with an armored slant—of the war that took more than 58,000 American lives, this book is a highly recommended read.
Source : Leatherneck, magazine of the Marines, Marine Corps Association.
Of the several thousand tomes published about the Vietnam War, only a few English-language viewpoints written by our Vietnamese allies grace the bookshelves. The South Vietnamese perspective, constrained by cultural and linguistic barriers, is unfortunately marginalized in the war’s literature for Americans. Due to these barriers, U.S. historians, even if interested in South Vietnamese motivations and actions, are left with little except military adviser reports, obscure embassy cables, or shallow news articles. Thus reduced to bit players, the South Vietnamese have become caricatures; either cowardly incompetents or corrupt warlords, with an occasional brave soul or hard-fighting unit briefly mentioned. A more balanced and deeper picture of America’s wartime partner has long been needed.
Former armor Colonel Ha Mai Viet has offered precisely that, a penetrating insight into the battlefield contributions of the South Vietnamese tank officers who fought alongside their American friends. His book details the contributions of a small but influential element of the ARVN, its armor/cavalry forces. Unknown to most, by war’s end the armor branch had grown considerably from its French roots. In 1975, Brigadier General Tran Quang Khoi’s 3rd Armored Cavalry Brigade, the III Corps organic tank unit, was undoubtedly the most powerful brigade-size element in the ARVN. Reflecting a rare combined arms outlook, Khoi built a formidable combat out-fit from previously independent armor, artillery, engineer, and ranger units. His merged brigade was still defending outside of Saigon when the final surrender came.
Viet spent ten years traveling the globe, tracking down and interviewing many of his former comrades-in-arms. He portrays the heroic deeds of his fellow soldiers while unflinchingly condemning South Vietnamese leadership errors. Covering two main topics, Combat and Military History, Viet outlines twenty-three separate battles from the ARVN side. The bulk of the Combat section covers the Tet Offensive, Lam Son 719, the Easter Offensive, and the bloody retreat in 1975 from the Central Highlands. He also provides rich details on unknown battles such as the terrible clash at Dambe in Cambodia in 1971. The Military History part provides unique facts on the formation and growth of the ARVN armor/cavalry branch from 1954 to 1975, including unit commanders, weapons, and organizational structure.
Brilliantly translated, no future work on Vietnam battles will be complete without reviewing this publication. Colonel Viet has provided a tremendous amount of fresh information, almost all of it oral history. That is the strength and weakness of the book. Like all interviews, the ones in this book only provide the participant’s side. For example, the account by Colonel Nguyen Van Dong concerning the Central Highlands retreat, while new and highly informative, perpetuates the myth that Brigadier General Pham Duy Tat, the II Corps Ranger Commander, was responsible for the convoy on Route 7B. Tat, when presented with Dong’s remarks, categorically denied the accusations, a point of view absent from Viet’s book. This is not to cast fault, as Viet was only interested in the stories of his armor colleagues. Yet without access to That’s perspective, the unsuspecting historian would perpetuate the story. Unfortunately, as General Cao Van Vien once told the reviewer, the war remains much like the movie « Rashomon »: the truth is subjective to the individual. Colonel Viet nevertheless deserves enormous credit for his industrious research and fine account. His is a major and much needed addition to the history of the Vietnam War.
Jay Veith. « Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia (review). » The Journal of Military History 73.3 (2009): 1020-1021. Project MUSE. Web. 27 Dec. 2011. <http://muse.jhu.edu/>.
Veith, J.(2009). Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia (review). The Journal of Military History 73(3), 1020-1021. Society for Military History.
Ha Mai Viet, Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2008, 459 p., $40.00 USD, ISBN: 978-1591149194.
Book Review by Dr J.R. McKay.
Ha Mai Viet’s Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia is an ambitious work. The author tried to produce both a history of the armoured branch of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and a history of the armoured branch’s unit’s roles on the ARVN’s battles with the Vietnamese Communist forces. While South Vietnam, and by default the ARVN, and its armoured branch lasted for only twenty years, this was a nation and an army that fought against its enemies for most of that time.
Steel and Blood is effectively two smaller books in one. The first part is a “Combat History” of the armoured branch’s participation in battles as well as a narrative of the war from an ARVN perspective. The second part of the book, “Military History,” is a summary of the organizational history of the South Vietnamese Armor Corps, a compendium of information on that branch and a comparison of its equipment with that of its North Vietnamese counterpart.
The combat history describes a series of battles from 1963 to 1975, based upon ARVN’s battles with the Communists. It starts with an orientation on the role of the armoured branch’s units in a series of battles, but slowly transforms into a general narrative on the progress of the war. Colonel Viet tried to tell the tale of what happened, balancing between what he stated that he sought to do and providing the proverbial “bigger picture.” While this might frustrate some readers, some observations merit mention.
First, one should keep in mind that he has provided a glimpse into a perspective that is often overlooked. The common narrative with regard to the ARVN has been that it was overly oriented on the byzantine politics of Saigon and insufficiently focused on waging counter-insurgency operations until 1968, when the Tet Offensive led to the development of a more combat-oriented ethos. Colonel Viet’s book points out that a number of ARVN units often fought harder than was realized at the time or since despite the political proclivities of some of the ARVN’s general officers.
Second, the author left one with the distinct impression that ARVN units tended to view their advisors less as sources of advice than sources of firepower. One gets the sense that during the earlier years, in some cases, ARVN officers may have resented advice from the technically sound yet less experienced advisors. The perception of advisors as sources of firepower appears to have become more acute after the 1972 Easter Offensive. The Nixon Administration’s policy of “Vietnamization” meant the phased withdrawal of American combat forces and increasingly shifting the burden of combat onto the ARVN. The Nixon Administration could not reverse this trend for domestic political reasons and sought to make greater use of air power as a result. This is a potential lesson for those destined for advisory duties; those being advised may be more interested in one’s capacity to influence the battle than one’s advice on how to do same.
Third, the book leaves one with the distinct impression that as the Communists made the transition from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare, the importance of ARVN’s armoured branch increased. The early battles described organizations analogous to reconnaissance squadrons conducting economy of force operations against the Viet Cong; the later battles described ARVN tanks duelling with the North Vietnamese counterparts. Indeed, the Communist fielding of T-54 equipped units prompted the ARVN’s fielding of a number of M-48 “Patton” equipped units to cope with the threat. This also supports a broader point about the nature of insurgencies. The endgame of any insurgency is to set the conditions for assuring victory once conventional warfare begins. Colonel Viet’s accounts of battle start with clashes with the Viet Cong guerrillas in the mid 1960s and ends with tank battles between the North Vietnamese Army and the ARVN.
This section of the book, unfortunately, was at times difficult to follow. The author sought to describe both operational and tactical actions without maps, but made references to a series of place names. While there was an appendix providing general maps of South Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh trail, the inclusion of a series of smaller maps that showed the location and how the battles occurred would have helped clarify the “combat history.” Throughout this section, one was tempted to read the “military history” to get a sense of the evolution of the armoured branch’s organizations before linking it to their combat performance.
The military history was a collection of related topics designed to inform the reader about the war, the armoured branch’s evolution and its equipment. Again, the ARVN perspective was enlightening and it allows one to see the conflict through Vietnamese, albeit Southern, eyes, as opposed to the American or French perspectives. The organizational history began with the Vietnamese National Army of 1950, which was the army raised by the French within Vietnam during the war with the Viet Minh. The ARVN’s armoured branch’s roots lay in the creation of a series of reconnaissance platoons in 1950, which coalesced into companies in 1951, battalions by 1953 and regiments by 1954. After the Vietnamese National Army became the ARVN in 1955, these reconnaissance regiments became armoured cavalry regiments, four armoured regiments, a school and an amphibious group. In this period, they were equipped with Second World War era equipment cast off by the French that had been donated by the United States. During the 1960s, the older equipment was replaced by M113 armoured personnel carriers and M-41 “Bulldog” tanks.
The book describes the 1960s as a developmental period where the armoured branch began to specialize more. Armoured cavalry companies were the most common unit, but the branch also began to field reconnaissance and tank companies as well. Indeed, the book left one with the impression that the ARVN armoured branch fought most frequently as companies within larger entities. Indeed, the ambitious combination of the “combat history” and the “military history” was most useful in illuminating such matters. Colonel Viet followed this discussion of the evolution of the branch’s units with a compendium of facts. This had the effect of breaking a logical sequence of information in order to provide a series of interesting yet esoteric facts. He identified every commander of an ARVN armoured unit from the troop to the brigade level, the surgeons, and provided an account of their reunion at Fort Knox in 2000. Unfortunately, the multiple sources of information made this section, and indeed the book, seem less of a general history than a sourcebook or compendium of facts about the ARVN armoured branch.
Ha Mai Viet was a South Vietnamese Armor corps officer who served for 21 years, retiring as a Colonel. During that time, he had served in a number of different positions within armoured units, but his two most noteworthy positions were as an Assistant Division Commander and as the chief of the Quang Tri province.6 This meant he had fought the Communists for at least twelve years before leaving his country in its final days. His patriotism and pride in his military have been reflected in his writing. In addition, he wrote some of the accounts of specific battles from a personal perspective. Readers should take these points in mind before passing judgement on the book’s value.
Readers may be wondering what value a book about a nation that vanished a quarter century ago may have today. What can the ARVN’s experience tell us today? Is it relevant for the Canadian Forces in the early 21st century? The short answer to such questions is yes; however, this depends upon one’s perspective and interests. Those interested in comparing the evolution of different armoured branches may also wish to read those parts of the book. One should note that the ARVN’s approach to combat development was based upon trial and error in battle; they did not have the luxury of time to consider their organizations in great detail. Furthermore, reading the ARVN perspective may give pause for thought for those destined for advisory duties about what those being advised may be thinking.
Dr J.R. McKay
1. The RVN is better known as South Vietnam.
2. Many readers will no doubt be aware of the American participation in the war, spanning from 1964 to 1973 and the end of the war between North and South Vietnam (1973-1975), however, many may not be aware that South Vietnam had to contend with several armed groups in its infancy in 1955 and coup attempts from within the ARVN. The Communist insurgency began in South Vietnam in 1957 and North Vietnam began to provide support to that insurgency in 1959. A year later, the North Vietnamese sought to see all armed resistance groups in South Vietnam coalesce into the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLF). Readers may recognize the other, slightly inaccurate, name for the NLF—the Viet Cong. The ARVN began fighting [?]
3. There are two examples of this phenomenon. The author defends the actions and decisions of ARVN tactical commanders at the Battle of Ap Bac (January 1963) and the President’s direction that contributed to the disaster in Operation LAM SON 719 (January 1971). For details, see: Ha Mai Viet, former Colonel, ARVN, Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armour and the War for Southeast Asia, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2008), 16-17 and 84. For examples of the criticism levelled on those two incidents, see: Lieutenant General Phillip B. Davidson, U.S. Army, Retired, Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975, (Novato: Presidio, 1988), 573-604, and Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam, (New York: Random House, 1988), 203-265.
4. Readers should be aware that due to the influence of the U.S. Army, the ARVN armoured branch used the term “Troop” to describe subunit-sized organizations and the term “Squadron” for unitsized organizations. This review uses the generic Canadian Army terminology of “company” and “battalion.”
5. The M-41 “Bulldog” came into American service during the Korean War and entered ARVN service in 1964. It weighed 24 tons, its main armament was 76 mm, it had 12 to 38 mm of armour, and it could reach speeds of 72 km/h.
6. This province was in Military Region 1 / I Corps Tactical Zone, just south of the Demilitarized Zone. He left South Vietnam in 1975, during the final days of that country.
The following story appeared in the October 1969 issue of TYPHOON magazine. The TYPHOON was published by First Field Forces Vietnam (IFFV) of the US Army Vietnam (USARV).
Looking like their fathers of 1,000 years ago, the Montagnards are riding out of the past. They are sure that
Their Time Has Come
By 1LT Roy C. Russell
In the Highlands near Gia Nghia, lives a pretty Montagnard girl, lithe with delicate features and black hair that streams out over the back seat of her jeep when she lets it blow in the wind. If you are a friend, she calls you grandson (though she is only 27), and she will get you discount prices on Ba Muoi beer at the local bar.
But say the Montagnards are savages, and the flash in her eyes says she would like to come at you with anything from a M16 to a crossbow. Say they are nomads who should not own land, or say they are too ignorant for schools, to superstitious for hospitals, and too primitive to make good soldiers, and she will erupt with the torrent of rebuttals that would scare the Black Panthers.
She can talk to you in French, Vietnamese, several Montagnard dialects, and English. « Where did you learn these? » you ask.
« In the forest, » she answers, and her eyes twinkle just long enough to accent the mystery that surrounds her. « You know I am 107 years old. That is long enough to learn many things, but I am still a Montagnard. »
She represents a new generation of Montagnards, proud of its past, but demanding a modern role in the future of the Highlands. You can help a village sacrifice a water buffalo by beating it to death with sticks and rocks. You can watch a woman plant rice by poking small holes in the ground instead of plowing it up and disturbing the spirits. You can sit through hot afternoons drinking ricewine inside smoke-filled longhouses which have not changed for centuries. You can imagine you are living a thousand years ago. But when the talk turns to politics, you know you are in the 20th Century. The Montagnards know what time it is, and a variety of groups — some militant, others peaceful — are making sure no one else forgets.
For generations, the Montagnards have lived in the Highlands, unconcerned about the Vietnamese along the coast. The feeling was mutual because Vietnamese fishermen and rice-farmers had no reason to leave the lowlands. Traditionally separated, the two groups viewed one another with suspicion and, eventually, prejudice. But in 1954, South Vietnam’s president, Ngo Dinh Diem, resettled approximately 200,000 ethnic Vietnamese lowlanders into land the Montagnards considered their own. he also attempted to blanket the Montagnards with Vietnamese culture. He eliminated tribal courts and disregarded Montagnard self-government and other institutions.
Over several months, many Montagnard tribes began to organize a resistance movement. It started with casual grumbling as men sat around their longhouses complaining quietly about strangers from the lowlands who were taking up more and more of the land, and about the government which seemed to ignore their established customs. Then, as occasional visitors travelled through the village, they learned that other tribes were talking about the same things.
Soon, messengers were hurrying along the highland trails to call a meeting of tribal leaders. In 1958, these leaders formed a group called « Bajaraka, » a name derived from the initials of four powerful Montagnard groups — the Bahnar, Jarai, Rhade, and Koho. United in this way, the Montagnards began working to make the Highlands a separate nation with its own army. When letters and petitions to the Vietnamese government, the United Nations, and various diplomatic missions were ignored, Bajaraka staged demonstrations throughout the Highlands. These brought results, but not the ones desired: all the Bajaraka leaders were arrested and jailed by President Diem.
After the overthrow of Diem, the government of Nguyen Khanh released these Montagnards. Paul Nur, who is now the GVN Minister for Ethnic Minorities, seeks peaceful cooperation between Montagnards and Vietnamese while preserving Montagnard culture and traditions. Y B’ham Enuol, once exiled and now living in the Cambodian jungles, became the leader of a militant faction known as FULRO (United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races), which wanted virtual Montagnard autonomy, a separate nation. FULRO has since been replaced by a legitimate political party working for Montagnard advancement within the Vietnamese nation. The third man, Y Bih Alio, joined the Viet Cong and fought to bring the Montagnards under communist control. A recent VC prisoner reported that he had seen Y Bih dead in a jungle a year ago.
Part of the communist strategy for victory in the South depended on driving a wedge between the Montagnards and the Government of Vietnam. Communist Montagnards and Vietnamese cadre from North Vietnam were sent into the highlands to live in villages, where they successfully exploited Montagnard prejudices and their hopes for independence. At the same time, communist military units terrorized the Montagnards, stealing their crops and forcing them to fight against the government. Since there were very few GVN representatives in the highlands, the VC cadre were not contested seriously, and by 1961 it appeared the government had lost the loyalty and cooperation of much of the Montagnard population. To counter this, the GVN let the US send Special Forces advisors into the highlands to train village defense units, border patrols, and other reconnaissance teams. Spirited and well equipped with modern weapons, these Montagnard units succeeded in reversing the communist success in the highlands. Even so, the relations between the GVN and the Montagnards did not improve. By 1964, the movement for Montagnard independence, which had begun peacefully, had become more militant. But its goal was the same: Montagnard independence.
In late 1964, Montagnard yearnings for autonomy were increasing at a time when they had the arms with which to revolt and when the countryside was weakened by repeated coups and disunity. This environment bred the first armed Montagnard revolt on September 20, 1964. Montagnard strikers (Civilian Irregular Defense Group soldiers in Quang Duc and Darlac provinces) revolted, killed some 70 Vietnamese, and marched on Ban Me Thuot. The organization which planned and conducted this revolt identified itself as FULRO (United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races). It appears to have been an outgrowth of the Bajaraka movement with the addition of an armed military organization. With American assistance, the GVN persuaded the Montagnards not to attack Ban Me Thuot. But Y B’ham, the FULRO leader, fled to Cambodia with several thousand followers.
Immediately after the revolt, the government of Nguyen Khanh met with Montagnard leaders and planned an assistance program that showed respect for Montagnard traditions. The Highlanders would choose their own representatives in the National Assembly and hold positions in the central and local administrations. The traditional Montagnard court system would be reinstituted. Entrance requirements for officer and NCO students would be revised to admit Montagnards, and a pre-military school for children would be opened. The government also agreed to recognize Montagnard ownership of land and to provide assistance in developing it. Additional schools would be built for Montagnards, and scholarships to high school and universities would be granted. Except for autonomy, most of the Montagnard’s grievances were recognized by Khanh, and he proposed remedial action.
The Khanh government, however, was replaced through a coup in 1965, and his successors did little to implement this program. The Montagnards felt the promises made to them had been broken. Tensions in the highlands increased. On December 18, 1965, there was a second FULRO uprising at various places in Quang Duc, Darlac, and Phu Bon. The rebellion was put down in a day, and its leaders were either imprisoned or executed.
At that point, there appeared to be little hope for improved relations. In 1966, the government of Nguyen Cao Ky began to implement General Khanh’s program. In February, a Special Commissariat for Highlander Affairs was appointed commissioner. At this time, FULRO forces began negotiating the conditions for their return to the GVN. Finally, on October 17, 1966, 250 FULRO soldiers swore allegiance to the government, by Y B’ham who was still the nominal FULRO leader, remained in Cambodia.
During the following year, tensions eased between the Vietnamese and Montagnards. Six Montagnards, including a member of FULRO, were elected to the National Assembly; President Nguyen Van Thieu signed a special law which recognized the Montagnards’ right to own their land; and the GVN established the Ministry for Ethnic Minorities with Paul Nur installed as a regular member of the Cabinet.
While most Montagnard leaders recognized that the GVN had outlined a credible minority policy, Y B’ham remained dissatisfied. Having lived in exile for three years and still in command of a force of militant Montagnard guerrillas, he claimed to have the underground support of thousands of other Montagnards within the Republic of Vietnam itself. Finally, in July, 1968, the government invited him to Ban Me Thuot for further negotiations. Y B’ham returned in August to a Special Forces camp in Quang Duc Province. From there he was flown by Caribou to Ban Me Thuot. After a week of meetings, Y B’ham’s position narrowed to a few specific issues. He still wanted some degree of regional Montagnard autonomy within the political framework of the GVN and with himself installed as Commissioner General. He also asked the GVN to arm Montagnard forces commanded by Montagnard officers to protect Montagnard villages and fight the communists.
He rescinded two other demands he had made earlier: the right of the Montagnards to receive foreign aid directly from other countries, and separate Montagnard representation in all international conferences dealing with Vietnam.
With this understanding, Y B’ham returned to Cambodia and notified his representative in South Vietnam, Y D’he Adrong, to make final agreements for FULRO’s permanent return to the country. An agreement was reached on December 12, 1968. Among other things, it specified that the Montagnards could form their own political party, fly their own flag in the same manner as do other political parties in the Republic of Vietnam, and that the returning FULRO soldiers would be trained and organized into Regional Force companies with Montagnard leaders. Y D’he returned to Saigon with the news.
In January 1969, more than 1,300 FULRO soldiers and their families filtered across the Cambodian border into Quang Duc Province, collecting near the Special Forces camp at Bu Prang. From there, they were flown to Ban Me Thuot, where an official ceremony on February 1 marked the renewal of their allegiance to GVN.
Everything had gone according to plan, except for one thing: Y B’ham, the FULRO leader, had stayed in Cambodia. The reason for this is still not clear. Either he was not pleased with the final agreement Y D’he negotiated with GVN, or he was held captive by a dissident and radical FULRO faction which tried to subvert the FULRO-GVN accord. In either case, Y B’ham’s absence did not stop 1,300 of his former followers from rallying to the government.
During the ceremony, Y D’he announced something which seemed to take most FULRO members by surprise: not only would they swear allegiance to the GVN, but they would also formally dissolve the FULRO organization and replace it with a new, non-militant Montagnard political party, later named the Ethnic Minorities Solidarity Movement (EMSM). While Y D’he’s followers did not expect this mandate, they acquiesced quickly.
Since then, Y D’he has played a less active role in Montagnard politics and has turned more to farming. Another former FULRO leader, Y Bling, took charge of the new party and continues as it chairman today. While the EMSM works to preserve Montagnard customs and to protect the full citizenship rights of its members, it advocates peaceful accomodation with the GVN, not militant secession. This is its principal difference from FULRO.
In a series of written agreements, the GVN has promised to issue land titles to Montagnard farmers; to provide better schools, medical facilities, and agricultural assistance; and to establish Montagnard Regional Force companies while integrating other Montagnard officers into regular ARVN units.
EMSM is now the strongest force uniting the Montagnards. Y Bling claims 65,000 dues-paying members, but probably many fewer are ardent supporters. Still, EMSM has emerged as the first viable form of political leverage the Montagnards have had — at least it is the first which has gained significant support from the GVN. How long it can contain the undercurrent of militancy in the Highlands depends on how well the GVN can fulfill its plans. In wartime, it is hard to build schools and train politicians. The Montagnards know this. But they also know this is the 20th Centry and that it is time they have a place in the future of the country.
La guerre du Viêt-Nam fut le premier conflit retransmis à la télévision. Pourtant, c’est le Laos voisin qui constitua la cible d’une guerre aérienne interminable et démesurée, devenant le pays le plus bombardé de l’histoire. Cette « guerre secrète », l’opération la plus importante menée par la CIA, reste aujourd’hui encore largement ignorée. Les spécialistes parlent de crimes de guerre et la comparent aux conflits actuels en Irak et en Afghanistan. Dans CIA – Opération Laos, les principaux protagonistes de cette opération (anciens agents de la CIA, pilotes américains, combattants laotiens, reporters de guerre) nous conduisent jusqu’à l’emplacement stratégique du conflit. (tvmag Le Figaro).
Durée : 80min.
Genre : Docu-info – Historique
Origine : Allemagne
Année de réalisation : 2008 Réalisation : Marc Eberle
Rediffusion(s) : 08/04/2012 à 18:55 sur Histoire
Virginia Morris: Security and Defence Analyst & Author
Virginia Morris is commissioned to do presentations on security and defence. Her specialist subjects are asymmetric warfare and terrorism. Virginia also examines how poverty and environmental issues affect these fields. She has worked for the United Nations in Lao, as an engineering consultant in the UK and alongside senior members of the Communist Party in Vietnam. Her work has led Virginia to be invited to give presentations to noted audiences such as American Special Forces. She has also been interviewed for Vietnamese and British TV. For part of her work she has interviewed Vietnam War Veterans. Many of which fought along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Most had been in American Special Forces for many years and some of which were Montagnard people. They now belong to Vietnam Veteran Associations and support Save the Montagnard People.
“Interview with Tran Van Don.”, 05/07/1981, WGBH Media Library & Archives, (accessed 12 Oct 2012).
As a former general in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, Tran Van Don was pivotal to the toppling of Ngo Dinh Diem during the 1963 coup d’etat. Here he recalls life under French colonialism, the rule of Bao Dai, and his relationship with Ngo Dinh Diem – leading to the coup d’etat and death of Diem.
Program America’s Mandarin (1954 – 1967)
Series Vietnam: A Television History
Duration 00:46:56:05 Standard NTSC Source WGBH Open Vault